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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 3/81)



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INTERNATIONAL

SHAH'S 'REACTIONARY' REGIME ANALYZED

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 11, Nov 80 signed to press 18 Nov 80 pp 58-74

[Article by M. S. Ivanov: "The Antipopular Nature of the Rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran"; the author, Mikhail Sergeyevich Ivanov, Doctor of Historical sciences, prof, and Deputy head of the Chair for the History of Near and Middle Eastern Countries under the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow University, is the author of many works on Iranian history, including: "Babidskiye Vosstaniya v Irane 1848-1852 gg." (The Babi Revolts in Iran in 1848-1852), "Ocherk Istorii Irana" (Outline of Iranian History), "Iranskaya Revolyutsiya 1905-1911 gg." (The Iranian Revolution of 1905-1911), "Noveyshaya Istoriya Irana" (Modern History of Iran), "Rabochiy Klass Sovremennogo Irana" (The Working Class of Modern Iran), "Iran v 60--70-kh gg. XX Veka" (Iran in the 1960's-1970's), and others]

[Text] In February 1959, the popular, antishah and antiimperialist revolution put an end to the despotic power of the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran. For more than a half a century this dynasty had plundered and suppressed the country, and had been an obedient tool in the hands of the English colonialists, Nazi Germany and American imperialism.

The state coup of 21 February 1921 was the beginning of the political activities of Reza Khan who in 1925 seized the shah's throne and began the Pahlavi Dynasty. This was a period of an upsurge in the national liberation movement aimed against the English colonialists and the rotten Qajar Dynasty, a rise in the popularity of Lenin's policy of the young Soviet state toward Iran and the other countries of the East. It was becoming clear to the English imperialists who had occupied Iran that it would be impossible to maintain their positions and carry out the previous plundering policy with the help of the Qajar Dynasty and the old feudal aristocracy. The coup organized by the colonialists was to remove the government consisting of representatives of the feudal aristocracy and bring to power an externally "radical" cabinet which would maintain the British positions in Iran, suppress the national liberation movement, and not permit the normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations.

The plan for the coup was worked out by the commander of the English occupation troops in Iran, Gen E. Ironside, by a Col Smith and the English consul in Teheran, Howard.¹ Also involved in carrying it out was a colonel of the Persian cossack units, Reza Khan. But the English military instructors, the officers who also led the operation, played the crucial role, as S. K. Pastukhov (S. Iranskiy) who in 1921 held the position of the head of the First Eastern Section of the RSFSR

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People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, has written.² Reza Khan was selected by Gen Ironside as a man known for active participation in suppressing the national liberation movement in Iran and for his hostility to communism.

After the coup, Sayyid Zia ad-Din Tabatabai who was closely linked to the English imperialists was put in the position of prime minister, while Reza Khan was appointed the commander of the division of Iranian cossacks. In April 1921, Reza Khan received the portfolio of minister of war. Numerous and diverse sources, in particular the Iranian press, participants and witnesses of the events, have described the role of the English imperialist circles in carrying out the coup of 21 February 1926 and the promotion of Reza Khan.³ In the journal of the Iranian People's Party DON'YA an article was published by the secretary of this party's central committee, A. Kambahsha, and he has given a number of new data substantiating the active role of the English in bringing Reza Khan into the political arena. Kambahsha sharply criticized those who felt that Reza Khan was acting independently, separately from the English, as a "national" figure.⁴ Western European witnesses who during the coup were in Iran also substantiated the role of the English imperialists in the events.⁵ And this was also openly written about by the English themselves who were involved in carrying out the policy of British imperialism in Iran. Thus, the deputy English financial adviser in Iran, J. Balfour, has admitted that the government created after the coup, having nominally nullified the 1919 Anglo-Iranian agreement, in fact observed its conditions.⁶ It is also possible to cite other, including American, evidence, for example, of V. Sheean and G. Haddad, that precisely the English organized the 1921 coup which marked the beginning to the elevation of Reza Khan.⁷

Both before and after the coup, Reza Khan was linked with the representatives of the English occupation command, and had secret meetings with them.⁸ The British colonialists, both directly and through their numerous agents among the ruling circles of Iran, supported Reza Khan, hoping to use him in the struggle against the growing national liberation movement within the country and against Soviet Russia. And in the cabinets which followed one another after 1921, Reza Khan remained continuously the minister of war. According to the plans drawn up by the English colonialists, he carried out a reorganization of the armed forces and from the diverse troop units (cossacks, sarbazians, South Persian riflemen, and others) created a centralized army which was subordinate to him personally. The gendarmerie and police were also under Reza Khan. Benefiting from the martial law in the most important areas of the country and referring to the necessity of providing the army with money, through his supporters, the military governors, he began to get his hands on the tax and financial system and on the entire economy of the nation. The British-armed Iranian army was used against actions by the people. It suppressed the national liberation movement and the peasant actions against the landowners and authorities in Gilan (1920-1921), the 1922 Lahuta Revolt in Tabriz, and others. The Iranian Communist Party (ICP) which was formed in 1921 and the trade unions were abolished. Also suppressed were the actions of the tribes who did not wish to submit to the growing power of Reza Khan. In the Iranian press these activities of his were depicted as supposedly corresponding to the national interests of Iran.

In October 1923, Reza Khan seized the position of prime minister, and in February 1925, under the pressure of the divisional commanders loyal to him and the troops ready to move against Teheran, the mejlis, against the constitution, passed a

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decision to appoint him the supreme commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the nation.⁹ At the end of 1925, the Constituent Assembly, elected under the conditions of the omnipotence of Reza Khan, with falsification and actual elimination of the masses of people from the elections, proclaimed him the hereditary shah of Iran with the family name of Pahlavi. Reza Khan assumed this name in order to impress the population with the ancient origin of his tribe.

Behind Reza Shah who had founded the new dynasty stood the English imperialists. This can be seen from the declaration of the English Foreign Secretary A. Eden which, after the entry of English troops into Iran in 1941, was broadcast over the London Radio and then printed in Iran as a separate publication. It stated: "In 1919, we concluded with Iran an agreement which many understood as our desire to turn Iran into our protectorate.... After we had seen that the Iranian people were poorly inclined to this agreement and considered that it pursued ill-conceived, self-seeking goals, we nullified it and instead of this began to strengthen the Iranian government and provide it with help so that it would be strong and could ensure order and security in the country. The secret of our support and aid to Reza Shah consisted precisely in this."¹⁰ From the words of Eden, one can see that the true purpose of English policy toward Reza Khan was to create a strong power obedient to the imperialists and capable of suppressing the antiimperialist and democratic movement within the country, and turn it into an anti-Soviet cordon. W. Churchill was even more categorical. After the English had sent Reza Shah into exile in South Africa, subsequent to forcing him off the throne in 1941, Churchill stated: "We put him on the throne, and we have removed him."¹¹

In applying various forms of harsh pressure, blackmail and violence, the shah took possession of the enormous rich landholdings in the most fertile areas of the country such as Mazanderan, Gilan Gorgan (Astrabad) and elsewhere.¹² He seized the lands of around 2,000 villages consisting of almost 10 percent of the arable land of the country, and became the largest landowner of Iran. With money stolen from the people, he built several large textile mills and became the richest man in Iran.

Under Reza Shah there remained untouched the remnants of feudalism as well as the harsh rent paid by the peasantry for the landowner, state and waqf lands (belonging in fact to the higher clergy). The peasants had to pay to the landowner from one-half to four-fifths of the crop and, in addition, perform a number of obligations in kind. The arbitrariness of the landowners predominated in the countryside. The peasantry eked out a bare subsistence, they lived in extreme poverty, they were almost completely illiterate, and deprived of any medical aid whatsoever. On the coast of the Persian Gulf, in Sistan, Baluchistan, Fars, Kerman and other southern and eastern areas of the country, many peasants for 6 and more months a year survived on dried and salted locusts, grass and ground date pits.

The Iranian workers lived under equally severe conditions. A large army of unemployed was constantly filled out with ruined peasants who fled to the cities seeking work. The workday lasted 10-14 hours. Female and child labor was widely exploited. Wages were miserly. Women for equal labor received half the amount of men, and children 4-fold less than men. Social security, labor legislation and labor safety were lacking.

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The workers and peasants who acted to improve their lot were subjected to cruel persecution. The democratic trade unions, the ICP and the other worker organizations were broken up and driven underground. Participants in the strike movement were arrested without trial, they were imprisoned and exiled to the remote southern and southeastern desert regions of the country. In May 1931, the government approved a special law against the communists, and this envisaged a punishment of 10 years of forced labor or solitary imprisonment for belonging to the communist party or for acting against the monarchical system.¹³ In 1937, 53 leaders of the communist party and the illegal democratic trade unions were arrested, and in 1938, extremely severe sentences were handed down in the so-called "Trial of 53." The shah's prison wardens murdered the leader of the Iranian communists, the professor of Teheran University, Tagi Erani, in 1940.

The peasant actions against the landowners and the shah's authorities as well as the actions of the soldiers, the majority of whom were also peasants, in breaking out in 1926 in Iranian Azerbaijan, Gilan, Khurasan and other areas, were suppressed by the troops, and their participants were turned over to military courts. In the Azerbaijan area of Hoi-Maku alone, several-score persons were executed under sentences of these courts.¹⁴ The new wave of the peasant movement which developed in Iran during the years of the world-wide economic crisis of 1929-1933 was also cruelly suppressed. In just 6 months, from July through December 1932, more than 150 participants in the peasant disturbances were executed, hundreds were condemned to forced labor, to imprisonment or were exiled to remote eastern areas.¹⁵

The shah's authorities also dealt fiercely with the actions of the Baluchi, Lurian, Southern Iranian and other tribes directed against the arbitrariness and violence of the military governors appointed by the shah. The nomads also protested against the violent conversion to a sedentary way of life. The shah applied barbarian methods for the mass resettlement of certain tribes to remote and desert areas, and this threatened these tribes with death. Reza Shah denied the very existence of the national minorities (Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiari, Baluchis, Turkmens, Arabs, Kashagai and others) and which comprised over one-half the population of Iran. Instruction in schools as well as court and office proceedings in the central and local institutions were carried out exclusively in the Persian tongue.

The slightest appearance of opposition and democratic thought was suppressed. The progressive intelligentsia suffered fierce repression. In 1924, there was the murder of the well-known poet Eshki who had been against Reza Khan, in 1932, the very prominent poet Malek ash-Shoara Bekhar was arrested and exiled, and in 1939, the poet Farrokhi Iyezdi died in prison. Also persecuted were the representatives of the clergy who were against the Reza Shah dictatorship. Ayatollah Modarres and certain other prominent religious leaders were arrested and murdered. A regime of arbitrary police rule reigned in the nation. The constitution and all democratic liberties were eliminated. The deputies of the mejlis were "elected" upon the instructions of the shah, and the mejlis was turned into his obedient tool.

Reza Shah carried out certain superficial reforms in the area of education, culture and everyday life. The schools, with the exception of religious ones, were taken away from the clergy and put under the control of the ministry of education. But the number of students was minuscule. Only the children of landowners, the bourgeoisie and officials studied in schools. As a rule, the children of workers

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were deprived of such an opportunity. Public education received 10-fold less money than the army.¹⁶ A decree was published prohibiting women from appearing in the chador in public places, and the police ripped the chador off those who did not carry out this requirement. But polygamy and the unequal position of women in the family and everyday life were maintained. Reza Shah himself had several wives. Women were deprived of the right to vote. Upon the orders of the shah who did not consider the opinion and desires of the population, there was enforced introduction of European clothing in 1928. Here the authorities employed naked violence and even armed force for suppressing resistance. In 1936, in Meshed, they opened up with machine gun fire against an enormous crowd of people which had gathered at the main Shi'ite holy place of Iran, the Mosque of Imam Reza, in protest against the injustice of the police in carrying out the order to replace the old headgear with the "Pahlavi" cap which was introduced upon the shah's orders. In carrying out a domestic policy that was unpopular with the people, the shah relied on armed force. An enormous part of the state budget was spent on the army. According to official data, over the two decades that Reza was in power (from 1921 through 1941), the army expenditures averaged each year 33.5 percent of all the income of the state budget.¹⁷

During the first years of the rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty, certain measures were carried out to strengthen the positions of the landowner and bourgeois circles of Iran. The conditions of surrender were eliminated and an independent customs tariff was introduced. But then Reza Shah more and more began to subordinate his foreign policy to the interests of the imperialist powers. In the Anglo-Iranian conflict of 1932, on the question of revising the concessionary treaty with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Reza Shah, contrary to national interests, held a conciliatory position. On 29 April 1933, the Iranian government signed a new concessionary treaty with the AIOC, and according to this, in exchange for a certain insignificant increase in the concessionary payments, the period of the concession was extended up to 1993 (by over 30 years in comparison with the old concessionary treaty). The AIOC kept all the unequal conditions of the old treaty which were extremely disadvantageous for Iran, including the right of the company to have its own police, to buy land, build railroads, ports, airfields, radio stations, telegraph and telephone lines, and so forth. These conditions made it possible for the British colonialists to continue the unrestricted plundering of the basic natural wealth of the country and use the AIOC as the main implement for applying political pressure on Iran.

The unified press depicted the position of Reza Shah at the Anglo-Iranian talks in 1932-1933 as the defense of the national interests of the country. But in reality, the shah entered into direct collusion with the English colonialists. He dealt fiercely with those politicians who demanded that better conditions be secured for Iran in concluding the new concessionary treaty. Upon orders of the shah, the minister of the court, Teymurtash, was arrested and imprisoned for having insisted upon an increase in the amount of the deductions of the AIOC, including the right of Iran to obtain a portion of the profits from the company's enterprises in other countries, the turning over to Iran of one-quarter of the shares of the company, the elimination of the monopoly of the AIOC to build oil pipelines, and on the right of Iran to cancel the concession prior to 1993, and so forth. Certain other Iranian politicians, for example, Mostoufi al-Malmalak and Sardar Asad, paid with their lives for acting against the interests of the English imperialists.

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Regardless of the normal relations which existed between Iran and the USSR, in 1937 Reza Shah signed the anti-Soviet Saadabad Pact which the imperialist circles of England, the United States and other countries viewed as a major link in the policy of surrounding and isolating the Soviet Union. In 1938, Reza Shah refused to sign a new trade agreement with the USSR, and this led to a sharp decline in trade between the two countries. This caused great harm to the Iranian economy and to the national interests of the country.

After the Nazis had seized power in Germany, Reza Shah began actively to side with the Nazis, feeling that fascism would be a more reliable support for his dictatorship. On the eve of World War II, Nazi Germany, with the aid of Reza Shah, moved actively into Iran, turning it into a German vassal state. Even in 1938-1939, Germany held first place in Iranian foreign trade. It was responsible for 41.5 percent of Iranian foreign trade, and in 1940-1941, 45.5 percent.¹⁸ Germany imported into Iran German goods at very high prices which exceeded the world level, and exported from there an enormous amount of raw materials which in terms of value greatly exceeded the German goods imported into Iran. In benefiting from the clearing agreement with Iran concluded in October 1935, Germany did not pay for this difference. The Nazis had a monopoly on supplying Iran with industrial and railroad equipment, they built airfields, they controlled military plants and other enterprises. Under the guise of specialists, experts and advisers thousands of German agents were planted in the nation and they conducted Nazi propaganda.

After the start of World War II, and particularly after the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, the Nazis endeavored to turn Iran into a staging area for aggression against the Soviet Union. The policy of Reza Shah led the country to the brink of disaster, and only the introduction of Allied (Soviet and English) troops prevented Iran from becoming an arena of military operations and saved it from casualties and destruction. The policy of Reza Shah which came down to turning Iran into a tool of Nazi Germany collapsed, and on 16 September 1941, he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza.

The collapse of the antipopular policy of the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty as well as the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union and its Allies caused an upsurge in the democratic movement in Iran. In October 1941, the People's Party of Iran, the successor of the Iranian Communist Party, was formed. With the balance of class forces existing in the nation during World War II, the new shah at first did not dare disclose his true face. The defeat of Nazi Germany and the strengthening of U.S. positions in Iran led to a situation where the United States became the imperialist protectors of the Pahlavi Dynasty. After the end of World War II, an acute rivalry arose between the United States and England over the questions of exploiting Iranian oil and the Iranian market, and a struggle developed for the dominant positions in the higher levels of the state apparatus. The American imperialists, using their military missions which had begun operating in Iran during the war, as well as advisers in the police, the gendarmarie and various economic departments, gradually strengthened their positions and drove out the English.

Mohammad Reza established close contacts with the U.S. imperialist circles, but not breaking, however, with the British colonialists. In 1946-1947, upon the orders of the shah and the pro-American prime minister Ahmad Qavam, with the aid of American imperialists, the shah's army dealt out fierce reprisals against the participants of the democratic movement in Iranian Azerbaijan and the national liberation

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movement of the Kurds. According to information in the Iranian press, 760 persons were executed and hanged in Iranian Azerbaijan. Several thousand persons were murdered by reactionary bands, by the police and soldiers in the course of unauthorized reprisals.¹⁹ The authorities dealt just as fiercely with the Kurdish democrats. Their leaders Kazi Mohammad, Sadr Kazi and others were hanged.

At the same time the democratic movement which had developed widely after World War II was suppressed in other areas of Iran. The committees of the People's Party and the trade unions were abolished in Teheran, Isfahan, Kazvin, Gorgan, Shahi and in other cities and regions. In Shahi (Mazanderan) alone, 500 workers were arrested, in Teheran, 400 workers, and as a total throughout the nation, several thousand persons. The arrested were beaten and tortured to make them sign false confessions. The soldiers and the police broke up the peasant unions which had been created during the rise of the democratic movement, killing and arresting the activists. The victories of the peasants (an increase in their share in dividing up the crop, the abolition of certain obligations in kind, and so forth) were eliminated, and medieval agrarian relations were restored in the countryside.

Regardless of the repression, the democratic forces in Iran continued to struggle against the power of the shah and the imperialists who supported it. In 1948, a mass popular movement began against the main bulwark of imperialism in Iran, the AIOC. According to estimates in the Western press, the AIOC, from 1914 through 1950, received around 5 billion dollars in profit, but during this same time paid Iran as concessionary payments only 420 million dollars, or around 8 percent of the company profits.²⁰ The People's Party of Iran played an important role in this struggle. In order to create a pretext for attacking this party of the workers and the other democratic organizations, on 4 February 1949, a provocative attack was made on the shah, and responsibility for this was placed on the People's Party. The authorities declared the introduction of martial law in the country and the abolition of the People's Party, which was forced to become illegal. Its leaders who were hiding in the underground were sentenced to death in absentia. More than 1,000 participants of the democratic movement were arrested. Within a period of several months, the military tribunals handed down mass sentences. For strengthening the shah's dictatorship, his rights were extended for dissolving the mejlis and for the first time in the history of the country, a senate was created which the imperialists and the shah hoped to use as a tool of the reaction.

But the repression could not prevent a further rise in the mass antiimperialist and antishah movement. The movement against the AIOC assumed a truly nation-wide character. At the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, in Teheran, Qum, Rasht, Abadan and other cities, mass meetings and demonstrations occurred and the participants of them demanded the canceling of the AIOC concession and the halting of its operations. This movement was headed by the People's Party and the other democratic organizations, as well as by the National Front led by M. Mossadegh and which combined various groupings of the national bourgeoisie, the patriotic clergy and other groupings. Under the pressure of the masses, the mejlis, on 15 March 1951, approved a law on nationalizing the enterprises of the AIOC.²¹ The British imperialists, endeavoring to maintain their positions in Iran and to block the implementation of this law, resorted to diplomatic, military, financial and other methods of pressure and blackmail. English naval ships were sent to the Persian Gulf. However this time this policy did not produce the expected results.

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On 29 April 1951, Mossadegh became the prime minister of Iran. He implemented a series of measures to carry out the law of 15 March. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was created, and this took over the AIOC enterprises. The U.S. imperialist circles, hoping to use the law on nationalizing the AIOC enterprises, initially demagogically supported it, figuring that the Iranians would be unable to manage these enterprises by themselves and would seek U.S. aid. But when the anti-imperialist movement of the Iranian people began to threaten the U.S. plans, the American imperialists came to the support of England. However, the joint Anglo-American pressure, the appeals to the Hague International Court and to the UN Security Council, as well as a boycott of Iranian oil did not alter the positions of the Mossadegh government. In January 1952, the English consulates which had intervened into the internal affairs of the country were closed down on the territory of Iran, and in October of the same year, diplomatic relations with England were broken.

Mohammad Reza endeavored to block the policy carried out by Mossadegh and to defend the positions of his imperialist protectors. An attempt was made to remove Mossadegh from power. On 18 July, the shah appointed Ahmad Qavam who was closely linked with the American imperialists as the prime minister of Iran, and this caused angry demonstrations of protest in Teheran and other cities of the country. Qavam and the shah sent troops against the demonstrators and the troops opened fire. According to data in the Iranian press, 90 persons were killed and 800 wounded.²² But the popular protest was so decisive and angry that on 21 July 1952, Qavam in a panic fled the country. On 22 July, Mossadegh again became prime minister and he assumed leadership of the defense ministry. The mejlis granted him extraordinary powers for 6 months.²³

In October 1952, a conspiracy was discovered of the Iranian reaction and the imperialists against the Mossadegh government. In February 1953, the reactionary military circles linked to the shah and the United States endeavored to murder Mossadegh. Thus, the American imperialists, even from the end of 1952, being convinced that it was impossible to persuade Mossadegh to turn over the Iranian oil to American and English oil companies, began preparations to overthrow his government. For this purpose they organized an economic blockade of Iran as well as subversive actions against its economy, figuring that a boycott of Iranian oil and virtually the complete halting of oil income would bring about a sharp deterioration in the financial and economic state of the country, a rise in prices and a decline in the standard of living of the masses of people. As a result of the boycott, the deficit of the state budget over the 3 years, from 1951 through 1954, increased by 6-fold (12.8 billion rials), and exceeded the total annual state income (9 billion rials) by almost 1.5-fold. The debt of the government to the Iranian banks by the beginning of 1954 during the years of the blockade had more than doubled (17.4 billion rials). The deficit in the balance of trade rose from 2.7 billion rials with exports of 4.3 billion rials, in 1951-1952 up to 7.4 billion rials with exports of 8.4 billion rials in 1953-1954. The overall index of the cost of living for the seven major cities of Iran (Teheran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Hamadan, Meshed, Rasht and Kermanshah) rose from 784 in 1950-1951 up to 992 points in 1953-1954 (the cost of living index in 1936-1937 has been used as 100).²⁴

The CIA agents, having begun preparations for a state coup in Iran and acting in agreement with Mohammad Reza Shah caused a split in the National Front. The right wing of the front (A. Kashani, M. Bagai, Haeri Zade and others) in the first half

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of 1953 sided with the Mossadegh opponents. Imperialist propaganda, aimed at distracting the public's attention from the coup being prepared, started up a campaign against the "growing threat of communism in Iran" and in favor of strengthening the shah's power and the "reinforcing of the throne."²⁵ Also involved in the preparations for the coup were the numerous American military advisers who were in the Iranian army and headed by Gen McClure. Also arriving from the United States in Iran was Gen Schwarzkopf who during the years of World War II and after its end had headed the Iranian police and was linked with the reactionary Iranian generals. The CIA agents maintained close contacts with the retired Gen F. Zahedi who was assigned the role of the formal executor of the coup. The conspirators used the shah's Guard, certain tank units and other military subunits located in the Teheran area.

The first attempt at the coup was made during the night of 16 August 1953. The shah promulgated an ukase on the removal of Mossadegh from the position of premier and the appointing of Zahedi to it. Then the chief of the shah's Guard, Nasyri, tried to arrest Mossadegh in his residence. But military units loyal to Mossadegh disarmed the soldiers of the shah's Guard. Nasyri and the officers who accompanied him were arrested. The moves of the attempted state coup caused a wave of mass anti-imperialist and antishah demonstrations on 16-18 August. Their participants pulled down the statues of the shah, and demanded that Iran be proclaimed a democratic republic. The frightened Mohammad Reza fled abroad by air. However the Mossadegh government did not take the necessary measures against the plotters. This was used by the CIA agents and the Iranian generals linked with them. Having brought up military units loyal to the shah around Teheran, during the night of 19 August 1953 they carried out a state coup.²⁶ Zahedi was appointed prime minister, while Mossadegh and his supporters were arrested and turned over to the court of a military tribunal.

In Iran, a regime was established of military-police terror, mass arrests were carried out, democratic organizations were broken up and newspapers closed down. The People's Party was subjected to particularly fierce persecution. After this Mohammad Reza returned to Iran. Thus, the CIA restored the power of the Pahlavi Dynasty in the nation. There began a 25-year period of an ever-growing influence of American imperialism which ultimately had taken over all the economic and political life of the country. Mohammad Reza was turned into the direct henchman of the U.S. imperialist circles.

According to an agreement reached between Mohammad Reza on 19 September 1954 with the International Oil Consortium (IOC) which had been set up in April of the same year and in which the main role was played by the American oil companies, Iranian oil was to be exploited by Anglo-American oil companies up to 1979, with the possible extension up to 1994. The conditions of the agreement differed little from the one-sided conditions of the AIOC concession, with the exception that now the profits were split evenly between Iran and the IOC, as was already the case by this time in all the other oil-producing countries in the basin of the Persian Gulf. Having signed the agreement with the IOC, Mohammad Reza helped to restore the positions of imperialism in the Iranian oil industry.

After the coup of 1953, foreign capital was given extensive opportunities to plunder the natural riches of Iran. After the agreement with the IOC, Iran concluded agreements with many other American and European oil companies on producing oil on

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the territory of continental Iran as well as in its territorial waters of the Persian Gulf. However the IOC, even in the 1970's, when these oil companies had already begun to exploit the oil deposits, was responsible for more than 90 percent of all the oil produced in Iran. The plundering of the basic Iranian natural wealth, oil, by foreign, and primarily American, capital reached monstrous amounts. While during the last year of the operations of the AIOC (in 1950), 32 million tons of oil were produced, in 1963, the figure was 72.8 million tons, and in 1974, already 302 million tons.²⁷ The IOC and the other foreign oil companies received enormous profits. With a cost of 75 cents per ton of Iranian oil at the beginning of the 1960's, the selling price was around 14 dollars per ton.²⁸ Each dollar invested into the Middle East oil industry brought the American oil monopolies an average of 9-fold more profit than investments into any other sector of the economy outside the United States.²⁹ In June 1972, the secretary general of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), Pachachi, stated in London that, according to official American data, the profits of the foreign, and primarily American, oil companies in the Near and Middle East in 1970 alone reached 79.2 percent of all invested capital, while the profit of the American companies engaged in extracting other minerals in the developing countries was just 13.5 percent.³⁰

Foreign, and primarily American, capital, in addition to the petroleum industry, in the form of joint companies also penetrated other sectors of Iranian industry such as the petrochemical, automotive, chemical, electronic, and others. In 1955 a special law was approved on the attracting and protecting of foreign capital, and after this foreign capital investments in Iran began to increase rapidly. While in 1970 their total amount was 5.5 million dollars, in 1977, as was stated by a representative of the Ministry of Economics at the opening of the Fifth International Trade Fair in Teheran, it had reached 7 billion dollars. In 1958, a special law was approved on lifting restrictions on foreign banks, and after this in the 1970's, more than 10 banks were founded with the participation of Iranian and foreign (American, English, West German, Japanese, and other) capital.³¹

In the various Iranian institutions and departments, there was an enormous number of foreign, particularly American, advisers, consultants and specialists who received salaries that greatly surpassed the wages of Iranians performing the same job. As was stated in November 1977 by the U.S. President J. Carter in a speech at a ceremony welcoming the shah to Washington, in Iran at that time there were around 40,000 Americans. In 1974, around 300 American companies and their divisions were operating in the country,³² and thereafter their number rose to 500. An "open door" policy was carried out in the area of foreign trade. This led to a growing negative Iranian foreign trade balance. By the end of the 1950's and the start of the 1960's, imports into Iran exceeded exports by 5-fold, and subsequently the foreign trade deficit increased further. This was a consequence of the orienting of foreign trade to the imperialist states. In 1974-1975, the importing of American goods into Iran exceeded by 30-fold the exports from Iran to the United States.³³

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi carried out a foreign policy advantageous to the imperialist powers, and particularly for the United States. Immediately after the 1953 coup, the abandonment of the policy of neutrality was declared. On 11 October 1955, Iran joined the aggressive, anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact which after the withdrawal of Iraq in 1958 was called the "Central Treaty Organization" (CENTO). On 5 March 1959, Iran signed a military agreement with the United States which, in essence, gave the

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latter the right to bring its troops into Iran in the event of direct or indirect aggression, by which one understood actions of the Iranian people against the shah's regime. These agreements led to an unprecedented increase in military outlays which at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's were more than 40 percent of the current state budget,³⁴ as well as to an increase in the number of American officer instructors as part of the U.S. military mission which established control over the Iranian General Staff and troop units. The United States armed the Iranian Army with the most modern weapons. On 31 October 1964, the mejlis approved a law granting diplomatic immunity to American military advisers.

The shah's regime and the Iranian Army were turned into a tool of American policy in the Near and Middle East. Regardless of the fact that formally Iran did not have diplomatic relations with Israel, in the Near Eastern conflict the shah actually supported this state. Considering the extreme unpopularity of the Israeli aggression against the Arab states among the broad strata of the Iranian populace the policy of support for Israel as dictated by American imperialism was carried out secretly. In words the Iranian representatives condemned Israeli aggression but in fact supplied Israel with oil. Iran did not join the embargo announced by the Arab states on the exporting of oil to countries which supported Israel, and cooperated with Israel in economic and military areas as well as in the intelligence area. The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad participated in organizing the shah's secret police or SAVAK ("Organization of National Security and Information"). The shah also cooperated actively with the South African racists, providing nine-tenths of their oil requirements.³⁵

The shah's regime in the Persian Gulf also carried out the same mission of the defender of U.S. interests, and primarily American oil monopolies. After the evacuation of English troops from this area at the beginning of the 1970's, the role of the policemen guarding the interests of the oil monopolies was entrusted by the United States to Iran. It was viewed as a bastion of imperialist influence in the entire Middle East. In carrying out this role, the shah in 1973 sent troops into Oman for suppressing the national liberation movement in Dhofar. Iran also helped Somali in aggression against Ethiopia. American imperialists were completely satisfied with the behavior of their policemen in the Persian Gulf basin. With good reason, Carter during his visit to Iran stated: "Due to the great leadership of the shah, Iran is an island of stability in one of the most turbulent regions of the world."³⁶

The United States intensely supplied Iran with modern types of weapons. In May 1972, President R. Nixon and the Secretary of State H. Kissinger signed an agreement with the shah according to which he could purchase any weapons systems.³⁷ The financial capabilities of Iran to purchase weapons rose sharply after OPEC, and in 1973, Iran along with it also increased oil prices by 4-fold because of inflation in the capitalist world and the increase in prices for the goods imported into the oil-producing countries. The income of Iran from oil rose from 5 billion dollars in 1973 to almost 20 billion dollars in 1974 and 1975. If these enormous amounts had been used in the national interest, they could have helped develop the national economy and raise the standard of living of the population. But a larger portion was returned back to the foreign monopolies in the form of payment for enormous amounts of weapons (the United States, England and the FRG), loans and credits to the developed capitalist and developing countries (England, France, Egypt and others),³⁸ and as capital investments in foreign

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companies (for example, Iran purchased 25 percent of the stock of the Krupp firm), and was embezzled by the shah, his family and the persons around the shah.

In the course of investigating an attempt at a recent state coup against the Islamic Republic of Iran, it was established that the Iranian Army was one of the chief tools in the strong mechanism set up during the years of the shah's rule for ensuring the political, military, economic and strategic interests of the United States.³⁹ At an international conference on investigating U.S. intervention in the affairs of Iran, a report was given entitled "The United States and the Iranian Army" and which pointed out that after the 1953 coup, the armed forces of the country came under U.S. control. The American missions to provide aid to the Iranian police and army, the military and military-technical specialists were to reinforce U.S. domination in the country. They controlled the Iranian air bases and all the armed forces of the country. Iran was turned into one of the major espionage centers of the region. All expenses for supporting the personnel of the American missions rested on the shoulders of the Iranian people.

The report submitted at the international conference also took up the role of the CIA in shaping Iranian policy, including the decisions of the central government. The American military acted as advisers of the shah on the questions of ensuring security, defense, foreign policy, and so forth, certainly, in accord with U.S. interests and plans without fail. The authors of the report quoted the cynical admission of the former head of the Pentagon, J. Schlesinger, that the U.S. Defense Department and the office of the secretary were to act as intermediaries between the American military industry and the Iranian government, putting pressure on the latter so that the weapons which the United States did not need or which it did not use would be sold to Iran. In this manner the latter was turned into a dump heap of American military equipment.

Under U.S. pressure, the Iranian military budget grew excessively from 880 million dollars in 1970 up to 9.4 billion dollars in 1977. America-Iranian military contracts from 1971 through 1977 reached 20.8 billion dollars. In 1977, the United States sold a total of 11 billion dollars worth of weapons to 75 countries, and Teheran was responsible for 5.8 billion dollars worth. Consequently, Iran purchased more weapons than the remaining 74 countries, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. In the United States, a special account ("Trust Fund") was opened to be used to funnel payments coming from Iran without supervision. The U.S. administration categorically refused to inform the Iranian side of the money deposited on this account. One of the secret Pentagon reports stated: "The United States is capable of halting air flights in Iran, by refusing to supply spare parts. If a revolution were to occur in Iran and the shah's regime would be replaced by an anti-American one, the United States could bring the new Iranian regime to its knees in controlling the Iranian Air Force." This statement helps one to understand the role which the United States and its puppets gave to the Iranian Air Force in the coup planned for 1980.⁴⁰

The shah also made large purchases of weapons in England and the FRG. The Iranian Army, some 400,000 strong, was armed with up-to-date systems of fighters, helicopters, tanks, missiles, and so forth. In 1975, more than 230 dollars per inhabitant were spent on military needs, and this exceeded by 2.5-fold the average annual per capita income of the rural inhabitants.⁴¹ The military expenditures planned for 1975-1976 of 525.5 billion rials (around 8 billion dollars) were 30 percent of

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the total gross national product of 1973-1974, while at the same time in 1975, in France, the expenditures were 4 percent of the total gross national product, 4.2 percent in the FRG, 3.1 percent in Italy, and 5.8 percent in England.⁴² In 1975, the military expenditures for each inhabitant of Iran, where the standard of living was 3-4-fold lower than the standard of living in the developed capitalist nations, exceeded by more than 3-fold the average per capita expenditures in the entire world.⁴³

The enormous military expenditures and purchases of weapons abroad were used by the ruling upper clique of Iran as a source for personal gain. The American magazine TIME announced that "the generals, ministers and other officials at the court and in the government regularly receive 10-percent commissions for weapons deals."⁴⁴ The embezzlement of state property, bribery and corruption, which has previously been characteristic of the state apparatus of the Pahlavi dynasty, reached unprecedented amounts during the last decades of the rule of Mohammad Reza. The shah himself, his family and close associates and highly placed military and civilian officials in the shah's regime deposited enormous amounts with American and Swiss banks. According to information published in the foreign press, the shah alone stole several tens of billions of dollars.⁴⁵

The colossal income from oil and the equipping of the Iranian Army with modern weapons turned the shah's head. Having lost touch with reality, he began stating that by the end of the century, Iran would be among the five leading powers of the world, and that the country would follow a path toward a "great civilization," and so forth.⁴⁶ At the same time the enormous military expenditures, the embezzlement of public property by the ruling circles and attempts to realize ambitious and absolutely unrealistic economic development plans--all of this led to a situation where the Iranian economy began to falter. Iran which in 1974-1975 did not know what to do with its money caused by the increase in the price for oil and the oil income, in 1975-1976 was in difficult financial straits. In 1975, because of the economic decline in the West, the exports of Iranian oil dropped by 12.5 percent, and this led to a decline in the oil income. Nevertheless the shah ordered that the budget expenses be increased by 26 percent, and the additional allocations were again earmarked to purchase weapons and for other military needs. This led to serious financial and economic difficulties.⁴⁷ In the middle of 1975, the Iranian government not only decided to halt the granting of loans to foreign states, but was itself forced to request a foreign loan of 4 billion dollars.⁴⁸ The economic growth rate of Iran in 1977-1978 dropped to 2.8 percent in comparison with 41.6 percent in 1974-1975.⁴⁹ Inflation raged in the country and prices rocketed. The situation of the broad strata of the people declined sharply, and the anger of the populace increased.

It was becoming obvious that the attempts at reforms undertaken by the shah in the 1960's and advertised as a "social revolution" for only a short while had checked the growth of popular dissatisfaction. Land reform had been the most important. As a result of it, according to official data, the number of large landowners having 50 and more hectares of plowed land during the reform rose by almost double (from 12,400 in 1960 to 23,000 in 1971 after the end of the reform), while their holdings had increased by more than double (from 1,554,700 hectares to 3,288,000 hectares) and were more than 20 percent of the entire plowed land. At the same time, the number of the smallest, unprofitable farms of less than 2 hectares during the reform had increased from 748,800 to 1,087,000, while the total area of their plowed

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lands rose from 570,700 hectares to only 867,000 hectares. These smallest farms comprising almost one-half of the farms of Iran had only around 5 percent of the plowed land.⁵⁰ Agricultural productivity remained extremely low, and the yield of the basic cereal crop, wheat, was 7-7.5 quintals per hectare. Around 60 percent of all the food consumed in the country was imported from abroad, while previously it had fully supplied itself with food products. In 1975, 40 percent of the entire gainfully-employed population of Iran was employed in agriculture, but they produced only 9.2 percent of the gross national product.⁵¹ The annual per capita average income of the rural inhabitants at the beginning of the 1970's was around 100 dollars. For a majority of the peasants the income was significantly lower. Many of them, having been ruined, sold their plots and left for the cities. Over the last 25 years, the population of Iran increased from 1 million to 5 million persons, basically due to the increase in the number of poor living in urban slums.⁵²

The laws on worker participation in enterprise profits and on selling the shares of the factories and plants to the public "above all to the workers and peasants," about which the shah's propaganda had raised such a great stir, in fact were social demagoguery and did not provide anything real to the working class.

In 1975, the shah, in endeavoring to assume full control over the sociopolitical life of the nation, disbanded the parties which he had previously created along American lines, but which had soon proven bankrupt, and created a new single party "Rastahiza Mellia Iran" (National Rebirth of Iran). Its basic principles were declared to be: loyalty to the monarchy, the "revolutions of the shah and the people" (the name given demagogically to the above-mentioned reforms of the 1960's) and the constitution. All the persons who did not share these principles, and most importantly, loyalty to the monarchy were declared to be traitors. This sham party was given the role of a tool in propagandizing the shah's policy. But this party did not justify the hopes placed on it and after 3 years was disbanded. This was one of the indicators in the crisis of the shah's regime.

The shah's foreign and domestic policy, the thousands of foreign companies and firms established in Iran, and the enormous number of American advisers, both military and civilian, caused growing dissatisfaction among the workers, peasants and intelligentsia. The artisans, tradesmen and the small and medium merchants could not compete with the flood of foreign goods as well as with the large Iranian capitalists. Among the broad strata of the urban population, indignation grew with the dominance of foreign capital, particularly American. "If the Iranian people look with distaste at the United States," stated one of the Iranian reports at the above-mentioned international conference, "this is the result of the actions of the pro-American governments which came one after another and led Iran to economic, political and social bankruptcy. The Iranian people witnessed the ever-growing intervention into their own affairs during the bloody years of the rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty, when more than a million persons were wounded and more than 100,000 killed. The relations between the United States and Iran were relations between the suppressors and the suppressed."⁵³ The Iranians were also indignant over American domination in the area of culture, over the nature of the TV broadcasts, and the showing of American and other Western films which were frequently incompatible with the ethics and morality of Islam.

At the end of the 1970's, the strikers who had demanded an increase in wages began to be joined by broad non-proletarian strata of the urban population. Student

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protests started against the antipopular policy of the shah, in particular, in the area of education, against Iranian intervention in Dhofar, and against American domination. Indignation seized broad groups of the intelligentsia. The clergy and students in religious schools protested.

The shah endeavored to suppress these actions by cruel repression, by mass arrests and punishments. SAVAK answerable only to the shah was given a free hand. The "security organization" with the aid of its secret agents controlled the activities of all the ministries, departments, institutions, plants and factories. SAVAK had at its disposal secret prisons equipped by American specialists for political prisoners who were subjected to refined torture. In the middle of the 1970's, according to evidence in the Western press, the number of political prisoners in Iran ran into tens of thousands of persons.⁵⁴ Iran held one of the first places in the world in terms of the number of death sentences handed down by military tribunals and executions. SAVAK dealt with many prisoners without a court. A rule of terror was established in the country.

But neither SAVAK terror nor an army armed with the most modern American weapons could restrain the growth of popular wrath. A revolutionary situation developed in the country. In January 1978, popular dissatisfaction burst out in the form of an antigovernment demonstration in the important religious center of Qum. The shah's authorities fired on the demonstration, several-score persons were killed and hundreds arrested. But in February and in the following spring and summer months, mass demonstrations engulfed the entire country. Troops, tanks and helicopters which fired on the demonstrators were sent against them. However, these massacres could not halt the movement which involved the broad strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the poor, the artisans, students, the national bourgeoisie, the workers, the clergy, that is, virtually all the strata of the urban population. The oil workers and workers of other industrial sectors went on strike. In the villages the peasant movement grew broader. Along with economic demands, political ones were also advanced directed against the shah, his secret police and American imperialism. By the end of 1978, the popular movement had assumed the nature of a general strike. In Teheran alone, several million persons were involved in the demonstrations. The movement had assumed the same nature in other cities of the country such as Tabriz, Meshed, Isfahan, Abadan, Qum and elsewhere. The unprecedented scope and strength of the popular movement can be seen from the number of demonstrators killed during clashes with the troops and the police. The foreign press mentions a figure of 60,000-65,000 persons killed.⁵⁵

The Shi'ite clergy which was headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini who had been exiled from Iran assumed an active, leading part in the antishah and anti-American movement. The socioeconomic backwardness of Iran and the survival of significant medieval vestiges were one of the basic reasons for the strong influence of religious ideology among the broad masses of the people. Another factor was that in the past the Shi'ite clergy had often led the masses of people against foreign conquerors and suppressors and sometimes even against despotic rule of the shah. One might mention the mass movement against the English tobacco concession of Talbot which occurred in Iran at the end of the 19th century under the leadership of the clergy. It involved the entire country and led to the canceling of the concession. The Iranian antifeudal and antiimperialist revolution of 1905-1911 started by mass demonstrations and holy parades which were also led by the Shi'ite clergy. During the years of the struggle for the nationalization of the oil industry (1950-1953),

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a portion of the Shi'ite clergy took an active part in the struggle against the AIOC and in defense of Iranian national interests. All of this created around the clergy an aura of a fighter for the cause of the people, against despotism and foreign enslavement.

In material terms, a majority of the Shi'ite clergy had traditionally been independent of the shah's powers. As a rule, the source of its existence was income from the waqf, the land and other possessions presented by the believers, as well as other payments of the Moslems. Since a predominant majority of the mosques was independent of the shah's powers, in the situation of SAVAK terror they became the only place where feelings of opposition to despotic rule could be expressed. The crushing and merciless suppression by SAVAK of all the viable democratic and opposition parties as well as groupings which could have led a popular movement also facilitated the promoting of the Shi'ite clergy to leadership over the popular actions. Its appeals found a receptive ear among the broad strata of the Iranian population and created for it the authority of a consistent defender of popular, national interests. On 17 August 1978, Khomeyni issued a fetwa (a high religious order) calling for the overthrow of the shah's regime. Confronted by a rapid rise of a national movement, the shah who had continued to receive U.S. support resorted to playing for time. In the second half of 1978 and at the beginning of January 1979, there followed several cabinets of ministers (J. Amuzgar, S. Imami, Gen G. Azhari, S. Bakhtiar), but these were unable to halt the growth of the popular movement. The general strike grew into a revolt of all the people. The army was powerless against the people's uprising. The troop units began to vacillate and some of them went over to the side of the people. On 16 January 1979, the shah fled Iran. On 1 February Ayatollah Khomeyni returned to the country, and he was given a triumphant welcome. He instructed M. Bazargan to form a provisional transitional government. For a certain time there was dual power in Iran. The prime minister Bakhtiar who had been appointed by the shah at the beginning of January 1979 tried to remain in power by relying on the army.

On 10 February 1979, at the Farahabad Air Base near Teheran, an exchange of fire started between the cadets who had gone over to the side of the people and the officers. It grew into an armed struggle between the supporters of the monarchy and the people. The cadets were helped by detachments of the armed people who seized the weapons dumps located at the base. The shah's Guard was able to suppress the revolt. Barricades appeared on the streets of Teheran. The armed people set fire to tanks sent against the rebels, and sacked the headquarters of SAVAK and the police. The army command uncertain of the mood of the soldiers was undecided in sending in the troop units to suppress the popular movement. The Iranian army, trained and armed by the American imperialists, surrendered to the rebelling people. The shah's rotten regime collapsed.

On 30 March 1979, a national referendum was held in Iran on the question of the future state system of the country. Some 97 percent of the voters were in favor of proclaiming Iran to be an Islamic republic. Thus an end was put to the more than 50-year bloody rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty which came to power and ruled with the help of the imperialists and was destroyed as a result of the antishah and antiimperialist revolution.

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FOOTNOTES

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- ³ETTAHAD, 12 October 1921; TUFAN, 3 October 1921; B. Omid, op. cit., pp 284-287; M. Bekhar, op. cit., pp 51, 62, 66, 69, 81, 95, 110; K. Makki, op. cit., pp 101-102, 104, 106-107, 110-111, 130, 225, 227-228, 233; M. Fateh, "Fifty Years of Iranian Oil," Teheran, 1956, p 468 (in Farsi), H. Arfa, "Under Five Shahs," Edinburgh, 1964, pp 109-110; R. K. Ramazani, "The Foreign Policy of Iran. 1500-1941," Charlottesville, 1966, p 176, and so forth.
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- ⁸K. Makki, op. cit., pp 106-107; M. Bekhar, op. cit., p 62.
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- ¹⁰M. Fateh, op. cit., p 468.
- ¹¹ZA RUBEZHOM, No 6, 1979, p 8.
- ¹²A. Banani, "The Modernization of Iran. 1921-1941," Stanford, 1961, p 125.
- ¹³"Compendium of Laws and Decrees of the Mejlis, Eighth Sitting," Teheran, 1933, pp 42-44 (in Farsi).
- ¹⁴A. Chervonnyy, "Disputed Questions of Modern Persia," BOL'SHEVIK, No 4, 1927, p 57.
- ¹⁵M. S. Ivanov, "Noveyshaya Istoriya Irana" [Modern History of Iran], Moscow, 1965, p 83.
- ¹⁶A. Banani, op. cit., p 97.
- ¹⁷Ibid., pp 56-57.

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- ¹⁸"Statistique annuelle du commerce exterieur de l'Iran en 1319 (1940-1941)," Teheran, 1941, p 3.
- ¹⁹MARDOM, 5 July 1947 (in Farsi).
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- ²¹"Compendium of Laws and Decrees of the Mejlis, 16th Sitting," Teheran, no date, p 14 (in Farsi).
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- ²⁹L. Tokunov, "The Near East: Oil and Politics," KOMMUNIST, No 16, 1974, p 115.
- ³⁰BURS, 18 June 1972 (in Farsi).
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- ³²Ibid., pp 204, 505-532.
- ³³AYANDEGAN, 27 August 1975 (in Farsi).
- ³⁴BANK MELLI IRAN BULLETIN, Nos 220-221, 1960, pp 224, 228.
- ³⁵P. Demchenko, "The Downfall of Absolutism," KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1979, p 79.
- ³⁶Ibid., p 77.
- ³⁷ZA RUBEZHOM, No 47, 1979, p 9.
- ³⁸The total loans and credits granted by Iran to other states, according to a statement by the Iranian prime minister A. Hoveida made by him at a press conference in January 1975, were 9 billion dollars in 1974.

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³⁹PRAVDA, 23 July 1980.

⁴⁰Ibid.

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⁴²PRAVDA, 23 December 1975.

⁴³PRAVDA, 18 April 1976.

⁴⁴KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1979, p 79.

⁴⁵ZA RUBEZHOM, No 33, 1980, p 19.

⁴⁶Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, "On the Way to a Great Civilization," Teheran, 1978 (in Farsi).

⁴⁷ZA RUBEZHOM, No 47, 1979, p 10.

⁴⁸AYANDEGAN, 14 July 1975; ETTALA'AT, 13 August 1975 (in Farsi).

⁴⁹"Statistical Annual for 1353 (1974-1975)," Teheran, 1355 (1976-1977), p 520.
The jump in Iranian economic growth in 1974-1975 was explained by the increase in income from oil as a result of the abrupt rise in oil prices.

⁵⁰"Results of the Agricultural Census of 1350 (1971-1972)," Part 2, Teheran, 1352 (1973), p 4 (in Farsi).

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INTERNATIONAL

ANALYSIS OF RISE OF ISLAM, ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE

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[Article by D. B. Malysheva: "Islam (Up to the Beginning of the 20th Century)". Dina Borisovna Malysheva is a candidate of historical sciences and Science Associate at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations under the USSR Academy of Sciences. She is specialized in the history of Africa and ideological questions. She is the author of the book "Religiya i Politika v Stranakh Vostochnoy Afriki" (Religion and Politics in the Countries of East Africa), as well as a number of other publications]

[Text] As is known, "any religion is nothing more than a fantastic reflection in the minds of people of those external forces which prevail over them in daily life, a reflection in which earthly forces assume the form of unearthly ones."¹ Marxist-Leninist ideology views religion as a social phenomenon, it explains "*materialistically* ... the source of faith and religion among the masses,"² and indicates how religious ideas, in taking possession of the masses, influence their daily life and thus become themselves a material force. For this reason Marxism-Leninism is against any sort of a "political war against religion."³

In history a special role has been played by the so-called world religions which have united masses of people under a common faith regardless of their ethnic, linguistic or political ties. Islam is one such religion. Islam (Arab.--submission) holds second place in the world after Christianity in terms of the number of believers. At the beginning of the 1970's, the total number of Moslems (Arab. muslim --one who surrenders or submits) was around a half billion persons.⁴ According to very inaccurate foreign data, at present there are around 0.9 billion Moslems (including minor members of families). They live predominantly in Asia and Africa, but also in Europe and America. In 32 African and Asian countries, Moslems comprise a majority of the population, and in 14 of them, an influential minority. The largest number of adherents of Islam live in Indonesia (125 million), followed by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (with 60 million in each). In African countries (Algeria, the Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somali, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar and others), Moslems comprise a majority or a significant portion of the population, and one-half of them is in North Africa, where Islam is the dominant religion. In 28 states (Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, the Sudan and elsewhere), Islam has been declared the official state religion.⁵

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In the countries of the East, Islam is also a form of social conscience and a factor regulating morality, law, family and domestic relations, and in many ways is also a way of life. However in spite of idealistic notions, it is impossible to speak of a "Moslem world" as a certain single entity. All these countries differ in terms of the racial and ethnic composition of the population, in terms of language, customs, culture, traditions, in terms of the level of socioeconomic and political development, the size of territory, natural conditions, and size of the population. The class structure of the Moslem Asian and African states also varies. For example, in the Arab countries of North Africa, a bourgeoisie and proletariat have already formed, while in a number of the Tropical African countries, these classes have not yet finally formed. Nor must we forget the heterogeneity of the ideological platforms of the regimes ruling in the Moslem countries as these often differ very greatly from one another. The Pan-Islamic aspirations of joining them together under the slogan of Moslem solidarity, to overlook or level out the contradictions existing between them, on the one hand, contribute to the consolidation of these states on an antiimperialist basis, and on the other impede the struggle to escape from obsolete forms of ideology and for social progress.

Islam arose at the beginning of the 7th century in the Hijaz (the western part of the Arabian Peninsula), during a period when the tribal system was dying out among the Arab tribes populating it and class relations were arising. The basic population of Arabia consisted of nomads, and among these an upper group gradually became separated, particularly the leaders of the tribes (sheikhs). The rich merchants who controlled the cities which were the points of caravan trade struggled against the privileges of the tribal aristocracy, and for a basis of this struggle required a more advanced ideological weapon than the old tribal cults, and for this reason they supported the idea of renewing the faith. At this time the religious map of Arabia was extremely motley. A majority of the Arabs were pagan and worshiped the moon, the sun and ancestors. In the northwest of the peninsula, the cult of the Bethels was spreading (beyth-el--dwelling of the god)--stones placed on their sides, the largest of which was black, probably of meteoric origin. It was in a niche of the external wall of the sanctuary of the Ka'ba (Arab. ka'b--cube) in Mecca.

By the time of the rise of Islam, around the Ka'ba stood 360 stone tribal idols, and the black stone was already perceived as a higher divine symbol,⁶ and this shows the gradual outgrowth of the idea of monotheism among the Arab tribes. Moreover, along with the polytheistic cults in Arabia, there was also the partial spread of monotheistic religions, such as Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism. They did not become dominant among the Arabs, but did play their role in preparing them to accept the idea of monotheism. The process of the centralization of the Arab tribes had a significant impact on the evolution of religious beliefs. This was particularly evident in the region of Mecca where the upper group of the Quraysh tribe had participated actively in the caravan trade and was successful in subordinating neighboring tribes. With the growth of the might of the Qurayshites, their ancient tribal god Allah (Aramaic "alakha" or divinity) assumed the primary position and merged with the greatest idol Hubal.⁷

The geographic position of Arabia and its involvement since ancient times in the trade, political and cultural ties with the various states of the East and West also contributed to the spread of monotheism among the Arabs. The Old Testament biblical legends and the evangelical revelations, the Ancient Greek philosophy and

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Roman jurisprudence, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism, the traditions of Eastern despotism and the state standards of the centralized bureaucratic ancient kingdoms, as well as the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Arabs themselves played a definite role in the formation of Islam.⁸

The immediate precursor of Islam was hanifism or the movement of prophets and preachers, the "seekers of the truth," who acted against the tribal cults and who worshiped the single god Rahman, that is, the merciful).⁹ The prominent hanif Museilima who died in 633 did a good deal to contribute to the triumph of monotheism precisely on the basis of the Ka'ba.¹⁰ In the Meccan, so-called Rahman chapters of the Koran, Abraham, the father of Ismail, who is considered to be the progenitor of the northern Arabs figures several times as the hanif. He is also venerated as the founder of the Ka'ba and the initiator of the pilgrimage to Mecca.¹¹ Until the 9th century, all Moslems were named hanifs.

The spread of Islam is linked to the name of Mohammed (c. 570--8 June 632). Probably even before him local prophets acting in the name of god predicted the arrival of the "hour" after which all adversity would cease. However only the prophet Mohammed was successful. His biography is not reflected in contemporary sources and was written down for the first time in the 8th century.¹² He belonged to the impoverished family of Banu-Hashim from the Quraysh clan, he was orphaned early on, and came to live with his uncle, tending his flock, and later worked in merchant trade. At the age of 25 Mohammed married the 40-year-old rich Meccan widow Khadija whose affairs he had managed. Acquiring material independence, he abandoned trade and emersed himself in religious and ethical problems to which he felt drawn. He began to be attended by "visions"; in spending nights in ascetic vigils on Mount Hira, he heard "voices" and in 609-610 began to preach the worshiping of a single god in contrast to paganism. As he related, during one of the nights of the month of Ramadan (in other terms, Ramazan, the 9th month of the lunar calendar, when the Moslems observe a 30-day fast during the daylight hours called the "uraza" among the Turks, the "ruze" among Iranians and the "saum" among the Arabs) the Archangel Jebrail (Gabriel) appeared before him and revealed the content of the Koran (that is, the "book for reading") which was kept in the heaven, under the throne of Allah, and after this commanded him to preach the will of god to his compatriots.

The success of the preachings of Mohammed was brought about by the fact that the new belief became one of the forms for the struggle of ordinary people against the feudalized tribal upper clique and the merchant-usurer group who acted in the role of suppressors, while the ideas of equality and fraternity contained in these teachings met the aspirations of the poorest strata of the population. The preachings of Mohammed caused dissatisfaction among the Qurayshite upper clique of Mecca and the priests of the Ka'ba who lived off the sacrifices and pilgrims. After the death of his wife and uncle, Mohammed was forced to leave with a few followers (the "ansars") for nearby Yathrib (subsequently Medina). As rivals of the Qurayshites, the people of Medina willingly accepted him and soon thereafter Mohammed there founded a community which united the local Arabic (Aws, Khazraj) and Jewish (Keinoka, Kureiza, Nadir) tribes. This event marked a political success of the new teachings. For this reason the year 622, the date of the "hijra" (or resettlement) is considered the first year in the Moslem era.¹³

The Arabian aristocracy was quick to recognize the advantages of the idea of monotheism, as with its aid it would be possible to more easily reconcile the masses of

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people to the joyless reality. And in fact, having carried out his "religious revolution,"¹⁴ Mohammed created in Medina a model society in which religion served as the justification of the existing law and order, social suppression and political conquests. For this reason Islam from its very inception began to assume the nature of a state religion. Soon, Southern and Western Arabia fell under its influence. In the year 630, the resistance of Mecca was broken. The supporters of the Medina prophet accompanied by the Bedouins who had accepted Islam peacefully entered the city, while the Qurayshite aristocracy, having accepted Islam, assumed a prominent place among the closest followers of the prophet: "The leading circles of Mecca...now could peacefully enter the community of Mohammed; they were no longer confronted with a dangerous dreamer but rather the ruler of a state to whom they could be and actually were useful."¹⁵ Mecca was declared to be the sacred capital of the Moslems, and in 632, Mohammed made a "hajj" (pilgrimage) there, thus becoming the first haji. He was buried in Medina, and his grave is considered to be the second holy place after the Ka'ba among the followers of Islam.

After the death of Mohammed, the question arose of who would be his "khalif" [caliph] (successor) and would become the theocratic head of the Moslems, bringing together the leaders of the religious community and the state.¹⁶ Although Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law and cousin, was closest to the prophet, Abu Bakr was chosen the first caliph (632-634). His successors Omar (634-644) and Osman (644-656), like Abu Bakr, were "muhajirs" (participants in the hijra). However even then currents and sects appeared in Islam. This was related to the political rivalry, the struggle for power and the various interpretations of the dogmas found in the Koran as well as in the Sunna and hadiths.

The Koran (Arab. kara'a--to read) is as holy for the Moslems as the Bible is for the Christians and the Jews. All significant events are sanctified by the reading of the Koran whether it is the birth of a child, trade transactions, testimony in court, marriage or death. It was written in the ancient Arabic tongue, which at present is a dead language. According to Moslem tradition, the Koran was not created but existed eternally. But science has shown that it was written after the death of Mohammed, and during his life no such book existed. The words of the prophet were kept in the memory of his supporters and followers. After his death only fragmentary notes remained on the leaves of date palms, stones and bones.¹⁷ Hearing that the prophecies would be forgotten, Abu Bakr instructed Mohammed's former secretary, Zayd Ibn Sabit, to bring together the variations of the prophecies. As a result of the work done under Caliph Osman, the text was canonized (the Osman reaction), and the remaining variations were destroyed. The modern canonical text is contained in the Cairo edition of 1923. Europeans first learned of the text of the Koran from a Latin version in the 12th century, and a complete translation into French was made only in the 17th century.¹⁸ The most recent Russian translation from the Arabic original was made by Academician N. Yu. Krachkovskiy.¹⁹

Since the positioning of the 114 suras (chapters) of the Koran is based upon their length (the long ones are placed at the beginning, the short ones at the end), there has been a mixing of the chronological order of the exposition of the material divided into 90 Meccan chapters (the years 610-622) and the 24 Yathriban [Medinan]. And in the "ayyats" (verses) from which the suras are formed, quite often it is a question of things that are not related either thematically or in time. For this reason editing was needed which, however, would not eliminate the alogisms. Moslem legend has it that Osman devoted the main share of the day to

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working on the sacred text and was murdered while at this work. Sheets of the Koran which supposedly were bespattered with Osman's blood have become an article of veneration. One such sheet kept in St. Petersburg was a flagrant forgery.²⁰ As for the content, the Meccan prophecies predict the near end of the world, after which will follow retribution for crimes committed. These suras have, thus, an eschatological character. They have been written by inspiration, and represent rhymed phrases with a definite rhythm and abrupt assonances, and look like a flow of intertwined, confused invocations. The Medinan prophecies are more practical and are determined by the political and social tasks which then confronted Mohammed, acting now not as a hanif, but rather as a political figure and leader of an influential community. These same suras contain the standards aimed at regulating the way of life of the believers. Here the prophecies descend to the level of prose.²¹

Belief in the single god Allah and his messenger Mohammed is expressed in the "jihad" (formula): "There is no other god but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet." This is the basic dogma of Islam. From this also derived the name of the new religion as the belief of the "Moslems," and the teaching of predestination here has been brought to complete fatalism and blind obedience of fate. "Fatalism is the basic core of Moslemism."²² Man is powerless to make an independent choice between good and evil and choose his path. Allah has done this for him, and He "whom He so desires...leads astray, and whom He so desires brings to the straight path...."²³ What has been promised to you will come about, and you are unable to change this. Due to such confidence in the unchanging predetermination of fate, the Moslems entered a "Holy War" without fear and doubt. The believer who remained alive received gain, while the killed entered paradise. The idea of predestination plays an important role also in the justification of class, political and property inequality by the exploiters.

The Koran instructs the believers to carry out noble deeds: to contribute to the poor the "zakat" (tax) comprising around 2.5 percent of the total value of property, to say prayers (Pers.--namaz, Arab.--salat) five times a day, to observe the fast, and visit holy places. The "jihad" (zeal) or war against the "infidels" was declared a holy cause, and in Russia this was often called a "gazawat" (raid).²⁴ In form, the Koran is a dialogue between Allah (who speaks now in the third person and then in the first) and nonbelievers. It discusses polytheism; Allah is shown to be the creator of the world; a description is given of Judgment Day, Paradise and Hell; polemics are waged against the non-Moslems; the death is described of the peoples who have not followed the prophets; the way of life and conduct of the believers are prescribed; the ritual rules are given.²⁵ This is the first written monument of Arab prose.

The lack of clarity, the cloudy allusions and contradictions found in the Koran necessitated an interpretation of it. Commentators appeared. The founder of exegesis (the "true" interpretation) is considered to be the second cousin of Mohammed, ibn Al-Abbas (died c. 677). In the Middle Ages, the most honored were the commentaries of the historian and theologian of the 9th-10th centuries, al-Tabari,²⁶ and which up to the present have served as a support for the conservatives. Conversely, the Moslems who have endeavored to renew Islam, adapting it to the modern age, have followed the commentaries of the religious reformer of the 19th century, M. 'Abduh, one of the founders of Pan-Islamism.²⁷

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The doctrines of Islam have not remained fixed but have been updated by the Moslem theologians al-Bukhari, an-Nishapuri and others. They compiled the "sunna" (way of actions) which should derive from the holy tradition. This is given in the "hadiths" or stories about the life, miracles and teachings of Mohammed and his companions. All Arab tribes at one time had their own sunna which was passed down from generation to generation.²⁸ The hadiths which came into being after the birth of Islam reflected changes in the life of the Arabs who moved into a class society and adapted much from the peoples conquered by them. In the hadiths one encounters borrowings from the bible, the Gospels, Ancient Greek, Hellenistic Persian and Indian works. All of this was covered under the name of Mohammed. A compendium of tens of thousands of hadiths compiled in the 10th century was named the "sunna," and thereafter became one of the sources of Moslem law.

Each hadith consists of a matn (the text reflecting the content) and the isnad ("support"; it gives the persons who were the transmitters).²⁹ In the struggle of the religions-political groupings for power, each side endeavored to reinforce its position by words which had been said at one time by the prophet. Precisely in order to reduce the abusing of the name of Mohammed, from the second half of the 8th century, the hadiths began to be classified and were compiled in six canonical collections, and the most reliable are considered to be those belonging to al-Bukhari and an-Nishapuri. Soon the Moslem theologians stated that the sunna could get by without the Koran, but the Koran could not get by without the sunna. The orthodox were therefore given the name "akhl as-sunna" (people of the sunna, or tantamount to the concept of "orthodox"). Those who departed from the sunna fell into a state of "bidy," or heresy, or even became a supporter of "qufr" or complete disbelief.

A predominant portion of the hadiths were written to explain phenomena in the life of the caliphate and which occurred after the death of the Prophet. In addition to legendary material, they contain data which are of value for studying the history of Islam as well as socioeconomic, political and moral-legal relations. Differences of opinion over the question of "bidy" or innovations in Islam led to the formation of various schools of Islamic law or "maddhabs" (that is, ways). Up to the present, four of them have maintained an influence and they have been named after their founders or jurist-imams: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. The school of the followers of ibn Hanbal, basically the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia, is the strictest and is marked by extreme intolerance and because of this has been least widespread. The followers of Abu Hanifa who predominate in the Asian countries take a calmer attitude toward state innovations. The students of Malik ibn Anas (the countries of the Magreb and West Africa) zealously honor the sunna. The followers of al-Shafi'i (East Africa and Indonesia) have endeavored to reconcile the Hanafis and Malikis.

All four schools are based on the shariat (Arab. sharia--pure way), a compendium of religious, ethical and legal precepts. This is a typical feudal law which for a long time protected the class interests of the feudal rulers, the rich merchants and the clergy.³⁰ The shariat is based not only on the Koran and sunna, but also on the "fiqh" (Arab.--"understanding") derived from them. This is jurisprudence which employs the "kiyas" or logical interpretation of the Koran and the "ijmu" (agreement) or the general opinion of experts on domestic questions and who hand down a "fatwa" (decision) on a specific case. Without such a decision, no case would make headway. The shariat officially regulated all aspects of the life of

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Moslem society, but actually prevailed in the system of family and inheritance law. In the spheres of trade, finance and administration, it was unable to replace state and civil law. Moreover, the Moslem jurists kept a number of provisions of customary law, the adat, which existed among the Arabs prior to Islam.³¹

Moslem jurists divide the deeds of people into five main categories: compulsory, recommended, permitted, unapproved (but not punishable), and prohibited (punishable). The nonfulfillment of obligations without valid reason is tantamount to apostasy. The criminal legislation of the shariat reflects the rights of the property owning classes in providing severe punishments for the violating of private property. At the same time for murder there is only the right of relatives for revenge. A characteristic trait of the shariat is particular concern for property and little attention to the human individual.³² In truth, the shariat prohibits the practice of suicide, as well as the murdering (in special instances) of newborn female babies which was widespread in pre-Islamic Arabia. The provisions of the shariat dealing with women are extremely conservative. In a number of Moslem countries the latter are virtually without rights and are unbelievably repressed.

As a whole the ideology of Islam was simpler and more comprehensible to the broad masses of believers, particularly the nomads and farmers, than were Christianity, Buddhism and Judaism, while its precepts were comparatively uncomplicated.³³ These particular features of Islam played a role in its rapid spread among the peoples of Asia and Africa. Soon after the death of Mohammed, Islam was fully victorious among the Arabs. They united under the banner of the new religion. Their path was now clear: to convert the nonbelievers to Islam and put everyone under the banner of the Prophet. This path also corresponded to the desire for gain and military booty which even during the time of Mohammed had been an important source in the prosperity of the Moslem community. Four-fifths of the spoils was distributed between the warriors, one-fifth went to the leader and was initially to be given to the poor.³⁴

Under the first successors of Mohammed, "under the green banner of the Prophet," the neighboring countries of the Mediterranean and Near Asia were conquered. Their population had been under the power of the Byzantine and Sassanid empires and included Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Iran and Transcaucasia. In the 8th century, Arab expansion extended to all North Africa, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Spain. A vast Moslem empire or caliphate arose. From the 11th century, Islam spread into Northern India. In the 14th century it was adopted by the Golden Horde, and somewhat later by the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Western Siberia. As a rule, Islamization was a consequence of military operations. One of the comparatively rare examples of the peaceful spread of Islam was its penetration into Indonesia, where this religion became predominant due to the propagandizing by Arab and Indian merchants and there almost completely forced out Hinduism and Buddhism.

During the first decades of the caliphate, the aim of the Arab conquests was not to spread the new belief among the conquered peoples. Even the very participants of the conquests, particularly the nomadic Bedouins who often comprised the strike force of the troops, had not accepted Islam sufficiently, and (according to the evidence in the Koran) did not have the particular trust of Mohammed. In the opinion of a majority of researchers, the possibility of easy enrichment became the main incentive for the conquests.³⁵ These conquests were facilitated by the political isolation which existed in many states of the East, by the infinite

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quarrels between the feudal rulers, by polytheism and by the absence of a religion which united the other peoples.³⁶ The victory of the Arabs with the subsequent Islamization of the conquered peoples was also facilitated by an economic incentive. In Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Libya, where there were many Arabs, the process of Islamization actually came down to the Arabization of the indigenous population, that is, to replacing the indigenous language and culture with Arab ones. In Iran, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Afghanistan, where there were few Arabs, the economic policy of the conquerors contributed to winning over the broad masses who suffered from the suppression of the local feudal rulers. The land was declared to be state property, and the caliphs or their deputies disposed of it on behalf of the state. Taxes and trade duties were sharply reduced for the Moslems; the duties of the peasants who converted to Islam were eased. The accepting of Islam freed them from the head tax. The population which had been worn out by the infinite feudal quarrels linked Islam with a stabilization of social life. The urban inhabitants and merchants played a leading role in the spread of Islam. Previously, a merchant having grown rich most often encountered the envy of those around him; having been ruined, he did not find sympathy or support. After adopting the new religion and living among other Moslems, he gained social recognition, and his profession began to be considered virtuous and god-favored.³⁷

Islam answered the aspirations of the most diverse social groups and strata. Due to its simplicity, the accessibility of its dogmas and rights, no preparation was required for the elementary mastery of them, while the standards of the shariat largely coincided with the traditional customs of the new followers. At the same time "Islam, having maintained its specific Eastern rites, itself restricted the area of its spread to the East and North Africa which had been conquered and basically populated by Arab Bedouins. Here it could become the dominant religion, but not in the West."³⁸

An example of the easy adaptation of Islam can be its triumph in a number of areas of Black Africa. It was first victorious in the Western Sudan, where already in the 11th century the empires of Ghana and Mali were ruled by Moslem rulers. The Islamization of the East African coast started in the 7th century. It was restrained by the existence of a strong Christian kingdom in Nubia which fell under the pressure of the Moslems only by the 16th century (Christianized Ethiopia has remained from it). Arab merchants held strong positions on the western coast of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and later moved south, where they also created Islamic centers such as Mogadishu, Mombasa, Zanzibar and Kilwa, mixing with the indigenous population and forming the nationality and language of Swahili.³⁹ Islam was closer to the Africans of that era than was Christianity, because it arose out of a tribal society and in a way adopted its structure, inspiring the believers in a preclass society with feelings of their broader community and providing an opportunity to establish useful contacts with other ethnic groups professing the same religion.⁴⁰ But the simplicity of the principles of Islam led to a situation where certain preachers of the new religion, most often the Africans themselves, under the guise of Moslemism propagandized the former pagan rituals and their own views. This led to a distortion of Islam. In Africa to the south of the Sahara, as nowhere else, its principles became unstable and hazy.⁴¹

Like any religious current, Islam did not avoid splitting into schools and sects. Fifty years after its rise, the Moslems had split into three groupings which struggled for power and in time turned into independent religious schools: Sunnism,

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Kharijism and Shi'ism. Kharijism was the first to arise, when after the death of Mohammed, the struggle for the title of caliph became the central question of the Islamic community. After the murder of the third "true caliph" Osman, by the supporters of Mohammed's cousin Ali, the malcontents headed by the Prophet's widow A'isha and the deputy of Syria, Mu'awiya (the founder of the Umayya Dynasty) came out against Ali. Before the decisive clash, Ali entered into talks with them. A portion of his supporters in protest left his army, rejected both pretenders, and in 657 elected the rank-and-file warrior ibn Wahba as caliph. They were called the Kharijites (Arab. khawarij--leavers).

The Kharijites recognized the legitimacy of only two caliphs--Abu Bakr and Omar. According to their teachings, the community itself should elect a caliph by free elections, and the election was to be determined not by birth, but rather by personal qualities. The religious head of the Moslems should be the most worthy, zealous and loyal executor of the will of Allah. Because of this, any Moslem, including both the slave and the non-Qurayshite, could become caliph. Thus, the sunna was rejected which stated that the caliph must be a Qurayshite, and Mu'awiya I made the power of the caliphs generally hereditary, and established a permanent capital in Damascus.⁴² The Kharijites were also strict in assessing the conduct of ordinary believers. For the strictness of their ethics they began to be called the "puritans of Islam," and they themselves called themselves "shura" (sacrificing for convictions). The social slogans of the Kharijites reflected the aspirations of the masses of people, including non-Arabs and the mawali emancipated slaves. Later on the Kharijites themselves split in the moderate Ibadites (their followers created their own imamates in North Africa and Oman),⁴³ the irreconcilable Azkarites who up to the end endeavored to overthrow the Umayyads,⁴⁴ and the Safrites who occupied an intermediate position.

Another current appeared over a dispute on the question of predestination. Fatalism is defended in the Koran. It was beneficial to the Umayyads, as belief in the will of Allah sanctioned their right to rule. But the Koran also does not deny free will. The malcontents used this. The first to act together with the Christian Syrians were the Islamic theologians who were named Qadarites (Arab. qadara or fate). The teachings of the Qadarites who recognized that man was the creator of his deeds were developed by the rationalist Mu'tasilites (those who are separate) and who under the influence of Ancient Greek philosophy proclaimed reason to be the criterion of religion and the standard of life.⁴⁵ They were supported by the Abbasids. Caliph Mamun (813-833) made the Mu'tasilite notion of the noneternal and man-made nature of the Koran an obligatory dogma. The decline of Mu'tasilism was linked to the activities of the founder of the "qalama" the scholastic theologian al-Ash'ari (873-935). A former supporter of the Mu'tasilites, he later began to sharply criticize them, and his theological theory developed by orthodox theologians for a long time became a weapon in the struggle against free thinking.⁴⁶ Of great importance for Islam was the split of the Moslems into the Sunnites and Shi'ites. Shi'ism (Arab. shi'a--group) arose under Caliph Osman in a situation of acute political struggle, as a party defending the rights of Ali and his offspring (the Alids) from the Prophet's daughter Fatima, to the caliphate. Having been defeated, Shi'ism by the middle of the 8th century had developed into a separate religious current opposing orthodox Sunnism. Subsequently spreading into Iran and Iraq, Shi'ism repeatedly became the standard of the anti-Arab struggle of the indigenous population. This belief is based on the thesis according to which only the offspring of the Prophet can be the legitimate successors of Mohammed, or

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imams. They are the keepers of the "higher knowledge" while the caliphs "elected" by the community are viewed as usurpers. The Shi'ites who recognize the sunna interpret it differently than the orthodox Moslems, seeing the imams as infallible persons and the heirs of the Prophet. The disobedience of secular power by the Shi'ites and their struggle against the caliphs caused their persecution. As a result of the centuries-long persecution, a cult of martyrs had developed in Shi'ism,⁴⁷ They included Ali and his sons Hasan and Husein. The latter died in 680 in the battle against the Umayyad caliph at Karbala. This event became the subject of annual obscure mysteries, the mourning celebration of "shakhsei-wakhsey" during which fanatics whipped to a state of ecstasy wound themselves, expressing their religious dedication to the memory of the martyrs.

The split between the Shi'ites and Sunnites became so engrained that they became irreconcilable enemies, and the idea of suffering and atonement caused the formation of one of the most important elements in the Shi'ite belief. The Shi'ite dogmas do not differ fundamentally from the Sunnite ones, although the Shi'ites consider the wording of the Koran not completely satisfactory, as it does not reflect the role of Ali, and they believe that the true text of the Koran known to the imams will appear with the "mahdi" or hidden imam who will establish truth and justice. In the sunna they recognize only those hadiths which have been affirmed by the Shi'ite imams, and as a counter to the others, they have created their own "akhbars" (legends) about Mohammed and Ali. On the questions of worship, the differences between the Shi'ites and Sunnites are insignificant.⁴⁸

In the 10th-12th centuries, Shi'ism became the state religion in the areas where the power of the Fatimids had spread. As early as the 8th century, Arab settlers had brought Shi'ism into Iran, where it gave a religious cast to the anti-Arab liberation movement.⁴⁹ With the coming to power of the Safawids in the 16th century, it became the state religion of Iran, and also spread in Yemen, Syria, India, Pakistan, Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

Shi'ism gave rise to a number of deviations and sects. The split in it started as early as the 7th century over the dispute about the number of imams and the personality of the last of them. The most widely found current was the Imamites, otherwise the Isnashirites (that is, the Twelvers). They consider that the mantle of Ali had been inherited by 11 offspring, but the 12th imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi disappeared while still a boy (between 874 and 878) and was living invisible in a hidden place, where he would emerge by Judgment Day.⁵⁰ Until the return of the Mahdi, his will should be carried out by the nayb'i, trusted persons who would rule in the modern age of the "hidden imamate."⁵¹ These teachings found a fervent response among the suppressed peasantry and repeatedly became the religious grounds for the ideology of popular movements such as the Serbedars (Pers. doomed) in Iran and Central Asia in the 14th century against the Mongol-Turkic feudal lords, and the Sayyids (Arab. lords) in Mazanderan and Gilan (14th-16th centuries).⁵²

The teachings of the Imamites lay at the basis of the views of all the remaining currents of Shi'ism. The differences came down to the number and composition of honored imams. The Qa'isanites (the first Shi'ite sect) considered the brother of Husein and the son of Ali from a slave concubine to be the fourth imam. This sect disappeared in the 11th century. The Zaydites named after Zayd (the grandson of Ali) whom they considered, in contrast to the other Shi'ites, as the fifth imam, limited themselves to venerating five imams, they recognized the principle of

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election and denied the inheriting of power. In the 8th-11th centuries, the Zaydite Dynasty of the Idrisids ruled in Morocco; in 864-928, a state of Zayites existed in Gilan and Tabaristan; from the 10th century this sect became firmly established in Yemen, where its imams ruled in the north until the revolution of 26 September 1962.

The most significant split in Shi'ism in terms of its consequences occurred in the middle of the 8th century under the sixth Shi'ite imam Ja'far al-Sadiq who deprived his elder son Ismail of the right to inherit. A portion of the followers of Ja'far did not agree with this, and declared Ismail to be the legitimate seventh imam, thus founding the sect of Isma'ilites. From the 10th century, Isma'ilism existed in the form of two basic schools: the moderate religion of the Fatimid caliphs and the teachings of the "Seveners" (those recognizing seven imams, considering Ismail as the last), otherwise the Karmatians (from the name of the founder of the sect, Karmat), supporters of extreme forms of Isma'ilism who drew their support from the urban lower classes and the poorest peasantry.⁵³

In the first quarter of the 11th century, the Druze sect split off from the Isma'ilites (the Druzes were named after their founder al-Darazi). They believed in the divinity of the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim (996-1021). Hakim was marked by strangeness and imbalance: "At one time he sat with candlelight during the day, and spent the night in darkness.... Among the high officials no one could be sure of his life: suffering from a morbid quick temper, he could turn on his best friends."⁵⁴ Later to his capriciousness was added the demand that his subjects consider him a diety. The preacher al-Darazi became the first popularizer of this idea. The cult of Hakim was finally formed as a result of the activities of the Persian missionary Hamzah Ali. When Hakim was no more, Hamzah declared that he had decided to check on his supporters and would return again, and later Hamzah also disappeared in order to "return with Hakim." The Druzes seized mountainous Syria where they leveled the mosque to the ground, converted the peasantry to their faith and redistributed the holdings of the feudal lords, themselves becoming the rulers. During this period the activities of the third missionary commenced; this was al-Muqtan who also subsequently disappeared and who appealed to the other Isma'ilites with letters seeking help. The 111 messages of Hakim, Hamzah and Muqtan formed the "Book of Wisdom" or the sacred writings of the Druzes.⁵⁵

The Druzes community differed so much from the other sects that some researchers have viewed it not only as a religious current but also as a separate nationality. This question remains disputed in science. The cult of the Druzes was marked by simplicity. They did not consider it necessary to perform all the Moslem rites, and the existing precepts of the Koran were interpreted allegorically. As members of a secret organization, they helped each other, and distinguished themselves in their industry, restraint and bravery. Gradually the Druze landowners began to exploit the peasantry more and more strongly. In the 19th century, the Christian farmers of Lebanon (the Maronites) repeatedly rose up against the Druzes. Their antagonism was artificially fanned by the imperialists. At present many Druzes are members of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon.⁵⁶

In Islam there was also a significant spread of the mystic current "tasawuf" (contemplation) or "Sufism" (Arab. suf--wool; the propagators of Sufism, the Dervishes, dressed in coarse woolen clothing). This arose in the 8th century on the territory of Iraq and Syria and later spread into Egypt, the Magreb and Spain, and from

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the 10th century in Iran and Central Asia, and then in India. The first Sufi communities had prayer huts on the outskirts of towns. The Dervishes did not give significance to the rules of religious worship and rites. They were usually ascetics, and strove for individual unity with God and the achieving of this by concentration and internal contemplation accompanied by the appropriate exercises. They idealized poverty and abstinence, and they criticized the failings of the feudal lords and clergy, which won them popularity among the suppressed masses.⁵⁷ They replaced the five daily prayers with mystical zeal or "zikr" during which they fell into a trance and "merged" with Allah.

The Sufi doctrine provides for several stages of gradual coming closer to God. This path was named the "tariqat" and was realized in cloisters. In them the lay brothers or murids (seekers), under the leadership of a mentor or murshid (indicator) underwent training which came down to the complete rejection of any manifestation of one's "ego." "The murid should be in the hands of the sheikh like a corpse is in the hands of the washer of the dead," states the Sufi precept.⁵⁸ From the 11th century, Sufi orders were created. In the 15th century they developed religious and political activities, particularly in North Africa. Some of them in individual instances seized state power (until recently the Libyan king was the head of such an order). In terms of social composition, the orders varied: the Dervishes could be both impoverished and rich. The charters of the orders differed and likewise there were numerous forms of the "zikr." In some instances, the ecstatic trance was caused by singing, music and dancing, and in others by deep contemplation. In certain fraternities, the religious element was completely secondary (the fraternity of marksmen and jugglers in Morocco).⁵⁹

The Sufi fraternities often possessed a good deal of earthly property, and their heads (the office of murshid in certain orders had become hereditary), although taking the vow of poverty, at times became major feudal lords who played a significant political role. The view which arose in late Sufism of a religious leader as the intermediary between Allah and the faithful, belief in the magical abilities of the murshid to perform miracles and predict the future, and the notion that he possessed "barak" or magical strength helped to reinforce the political influence of the Sufi. The heads of the orders were often venerated as saints (in Iran, Afghanistan and India they were called "wali," in Central Asia "awlia," and in Africa "marabouts"), and the graves of outstanding ascetics became an object of pilgrimage, for example, the tomb of Amadu Bamba, the founder of the Muridian Order located in the sacred city of Tubu (Senegal). The worship of saints in Sufism contradicts orthodox monotheism, and this was one of the reasons for the persecution of the Sufi. Each of their orders gradually split into various schools which followed the teachings of their founders, whose authority was unquestionable.⁶⁰

The philosopher and theologian al-Gazali (1058-1111), "this Thomas Aquinas of orthodox Islam,"⁶¹ reformed Islam, reconciling Sufism with Sunnism. A Sunni orthodoxy had developed which included a religion, a ritual aspect, philosophy, law and political doctrines,⁶² and the teachings of Gazali had the strongest influence not only on all Moslem science and theology, but also on the philosophy of Medieval Europe. The further development of Sufism occurred by different means. These teachings were used by various class groupings. The Sufi participated both in holy wars against the "infidels" (the murids of Shamilia were considered Sufi), as well as in popular antifeudal revolts (the Serbedars), in the organization of the shah's troops (the Sefawid Dynasty in the 16th century), as well as in the creation

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of secret artisan unions.⁶³ At present, the activities of the Moslem orders, particularly in the Arab countries, are practically limited. In Turkey, they were prohibited in 1925. However this in no way has meant a crisis in Sufi ideology.⁶⁴

By the 13th century, the process of the formation of Islam as the dominant ideology in the societies of the Near and Middle East had been completed. Islam then remained in a state of quiet for a long period of time. In the feudal, despotic regimes (the Ottoman Empire, Sefawid Iran and the state of the Great Moguls), it served as the standard for wars of conquest, and in the period of decline as a tool of internal reaction. The exacerbation of the class struggle caused the appearance of new sects such as Wahhabism and Babism. The former aimed at returning Islam to its initial simplicity; the latter, on the contrary, introduced into Islam "new elements which met the spirit of the times."⁶⁵ The movement of the Wahhabites arose in the middle of the 18th century among the Bedouins of Arabia. Named after its founder, the Moslem theologian Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the teachings of the Wahhabites demanded a return to the simplicity of the first centuries of Islam, the excluding of any cult, including the cult of the Prophet, saints and graves, and the strict performance of the prescribed rites. The realization of this doctrine was facilitated by the fact that Wahhab became related to the influential Sheikh ibn Saud. Both of them, one the preacher and the other the sword, achieved the propagation of the new teaching, they united under its standard virtually the entire Arabian Peninsula, and formed a state headed by a dynasty which up to the present has ruled in Saudi Arabia.⁶⁶ Acting under the slogan of a jihad and the fight against monotheism, the Wahhabites attacked the center of Shi'ite pilgrimage Karbala (1801), and destroyed the holy places of Mecca (1803) and Medina (1804). In their daily life they prohibited alcoholic beverages, music, dances and modern clothing. Characteristic of them were a fanaticism, intolerance, and the viewing of the representatives of other sects as "monotheists." In acting against innovations and rejecting hanifism, the official school in the Ottoman Empire, the Wahhabites acted against official Islam. At the beginning of the 20th century, they got the upper hand in Najd, then conquered Hijaz with Mecca and Medina. At present Wahhabism has become more moderate, and the local holy places have not only been rebuilt, but also are flourishing, becoming an important source of income for the ruling clique of Saudi Arabia.

In the 19th century, the ideology of the national liberation movement arose in a number of colonial and dependent countries of the East. As a rule, these ideas were fostered by representatives of the intelligentsia who came from noble clans and theological circles, and later from the merchant class, the peasant and tradesmen milieu. Falling under the influence of Western ideas, these ideologists propounded reformist and educational views, and voiced the necessity of revising the sociophilosophical system of Islam in light of the development of science, education, culture, and the altered sociopolitical conditions and the tasks of the anti-colonial struggle. The ideas of bourgeois reformism were first expressed in Babism which arose among the urban poor and peasantry of Iran in the middle of the 19th century. The founder of the teachings, Mohammed Ali, declared himself to be Bab (Pers. "gates"), he preached the pending arrival of the "mahdi" and called for social justice, the elimination of obsolete rites and the equality of men and women.⁶⁷ Numerous adherents gathered around the Bab, and they propagandized his teachings in Iran, Turkey and Iraq. Among them was the well known Zerrin Taj called Kurrat al-Ain (Delight to the Eyes) and who became the founder of the women's movement in Iran.⁶⁸

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The teachings of Bab as an ideological banner for mass popular uprisings⁶⁹ caused serious concern among the authorities. The Shi'ite clergy fiercely attacked the Babis. Upon the insistence of the mullahs, Bab was arrested and executed in 1850. A portion of his followers was suffocated or burned, while others fled to Iraq. The defeated Babis split into the Azalites (named after one of the students of the Bab, Azal)⁷⁰ and the Baha'is (the supporters of step-brother of Aza, Baha'ullah, who declared himself to be Mahdi). Having discarded the revolutionary elements of Babism, Baha'ullah began preaching reconciliation and the abandonment of struggle, he was against wars in general, and for patience and the achieving of justice by peaceful methods. The idea of the abandonment of state frontiers, national independence and sovereignty for the sake of forming a "single world state" as advanced by the Baha'is after World War I as well as their abandoning of Islamic rites helped to spread Baha'ism in Western Europe and North America. Baha'i centers exist at present in the FRG and the United States.⁷¹

In the general flow of movements for the modernization of Islam which developed broadly at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, a special place is held by Pan-Islamism which is based upon the notion that Islam provides a community that is above class and above the nation. The development of this idea occurred under the conditions of the expansion of the imperialist powers and the birth of capitalist relations in the Asian and African countries. In order to avoid the collapse of Islamic civilization, it was essential, in the opinion of the Pan-Islamists, to return to its sources and by uniting all the Moslems to carry out a "Islamic rebirth." At the source of Pan-Islamism stood Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) who established the idea of the unity of Moslems in a struggle against foreign colonialists. He urged the Moslems to assimilate European science and technology in order to beat the colonialists with their very weapons.⁷² The above-mentioned reformer Mohammed 'Abduh (1849-1905) is considered to be the most prominent follower of al-Afghani.⁷³

In the search to actually carry out Pan-Islamism, its ideologists turned both to the Iranian shah and to the Turkish sultan. This led to a situation where the democratic and liberation elements gradually disappeared from their slogans, and the preaching of the consolidation of the peoples of the East on a basis of Islam ran counter to local bourgeois nationalism. At the beginning of the 20th century, Pan-Islamism had turned into a conservative current, and its slogans were picked up by the extremely reactionary circles who thought of strengthening the "positions of the khans, landowners, mullahs, and so forth."⁷⁴ In contrast to the Pan-Islamists, the Moslem nationalists were in favor of a complete modernization of Islam and the adaptation of it to the needs of developing the states of the East. From the beginning of the 20th century, this movement has spread everywhere. In a number of these countries, bourgeois reforms were carried out with the secularization of legal standards and cultural and domestic mores, with the confiscation of the lands of the clergy, the restriction of the sphere of action of the Shariat, the separation of church and state, and the introduction of a secular school education. Secularization assumed a particularly radical nature in Turkey, where after the abolishing of the caliphate in 1924 and the establishing of a republic as a result of the reforms of Kemal Ataturk, a great deal was accomplished. In 1937, "laicism" (secularism) was officially included in the Turkish constitution. At present Turkey is the only Moslem country where state power has a truly secular nature, and Islam has in fact been driven out of the sphere of political and social life.⁷⁵ In Iran, under the influence of Kamalist ideas and secular radicalism, transformations

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were started, the basic component of which was a series of bourgeois reforms and secularist measures.⁷⁶

The Islamic faith has influenced not only the ideological formation of the national liberation movement in the Asian and African countries, but also the entire atmosphere of the political struggle. During the popular revolts against the colonialists in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan and Indonesia, it was used as an unique form for the manifestation of patriotism and resistance to foreign suppression. At the same time, in the life of these countries one can clearly trace a different trend, that is, an appeal to Islam by the anticommunists, and a desire of the supporters of extreme nationalism to utilize religious views and organizations for opposing social progress and shattering the union of antiimperialist forces and the socialist world. From the viewpoint of modern Pan-Islamists, the Moslem states are primarily not national communities, but rather members of the "umma," the indivisible Moslem community which should oppose the radical currents and spread of socialism.

The development of the corresponding religious schools was of definite significance for the evolution of Islam. In the Moslem countries, in a majority of instances a religious education is a component part of the public education system, and religious disciplines are part of the school curriculums. At present there are around 30 Moslem universities or faculties of Islamic theology and law, many of which were founded long ago, as well as a mass of madrasa who train Islamic priests. The most prominent of these universities are: the Egyptian al-Azhar, the universities of Alexandria and Cairo, the Tunisian Zeytun University, the Indian Aligarh, Allahabad and Dehli universities, the Punjab University in Pakistan (also the Institute of Islamic Studies), Ankara University in Turkey, the Islamic University in Indonesia, Teheran University in Iran, and Khartoum University in the Sudan. They teach and preach orthodox Islam not only as a religion, but also as a universal ideology, politics and culture.

Under present-day conditions, the ideological delimitation of the forces of progress and reaction, the forces of a socialist and bourgeois orientation in the Asian and African countries is complicated by the fact that the awareness of the masses who have lived through an age of colonial enslavement is burdened by lasting nationalistic and religious ideas.⁷⁷ The religious peasant and semiproletarian strata are being involved ever-more widely and intensely in the ideological and political struggle. And although many political concepts voiced by party and state leaders in the various Moslem countries contain the ideas of the secularization of social life and the limiting of the positions of the clergy, it is still too early to speak about the disappearance of the religious ideology and the elimination of Islam from the conscience of the masses in the countries of the East. In some places there may be regression as can be seen by the recently more frequent attempts to interpret Islamic beliefs as a philosophy of life which encompasses all spheres of human endeavor: the economy, politics, ideology and everyday life. Under these conditions, Islam continues to remain one of the factors impeding the spread of the ideas of scientific socialism. There are also instances of an eclectic use of Islamic ideas, and this has led to attempts to reconcile Islam, nationalism and socialist slogans. Thus, revolutionary petty bourgeois leaders, particularly in the Arab countries, consider the teachings of Mohammed about the equality of all people before Allah as close to the ideas of democracy and socialism. Characteristic of the concepts of "Islamic socialism" is a denial of

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scientific socialism, an assertion of its "inapplicability" in an Islamic society, defense of private property and its "divine" nature, and an emphasis of the dissimilarity of the idea of Moslem ownership to either private capitalist or socialist. Here the class struggle is denied and the "naturalness" of social and economic inequality is asserted.⁷⁸ The ideology of Islam thus provides concrete material for using it in the most diverse social currents in the course of the political struggle now developing in the countries of the East.

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⁷⁸"Bor'ba Iley v Sovremennom Mire" [The Struggle of Ideas in the Modern World],
Vol 3, Moscow, 1978, p 264.

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INTERNATIONAL

TURKMEN IDEOLOGIST ATTACKS WESTERN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO USSR

Ashkhabad TURKMENISTAN KOMMUNISTI in Turkmen No 11, Nov 80, pp 58-63

[Article by K. Bagdasarov: "On Principles and Methods of Bourgeois Propaganda"]

[Text] The principles of propaganda consist of rules for directing propaganda work. These principles are the expression of a class ideology and of a precise world view.

The methods of propaganda, consisting of a system of principles and means, disseminate clear ideas and theories with their help, and men's beliefs are brought to fruition. The methods of propaganda derive from its basic principles and express the class content of these principles.

The clarification of the class aspect of propaganda is a fundamental condition of the comprehension of its principles, methods, goals and duties. Each of the contradictory ideologies of the two social systems--socialism and capitalism--has its own type of propaganda. Bourgeois propaganda is directed at preserving the class interest of capital and serves the goal of steadying the imperialistic system. It is a part of the ideological apparatus of capitalism and influences all aspects of the spirit of a society and its way of life.

At the present time the role of propaganda has been strengthened in the internal and foreign policy of imperialism and has brought about a consolidation of the material-technical basis of propaganda in fundamentally capitalistic countries and an increase in the number of workers in the ideological sphere. Bourgeois theoreticians explain this by the proliferation of information, the growth of electronic methods and by the strengthening of the effort to communicate to people all the news happening in the world. Certainly the application of the newest means of information handling to the propaganda process influences every aspect of the propaganda process and does not restrict the numerical size of the listening audience. Truthfully, the powerful growth of radio and television has brought a source of propaganda into every home and puts hitherto unprecedented means to influence the minds of the people emotionally into the hands of the propaganda organizers.

But in the contemporary world strengthening of the role of political propaganda is formulated by fundamentally ideological factors. The growth of the importance of monopolistic bourgeois propaganda is conditioned by sharpening the ideological struggle between each other in the world arena. This situation has been especially stressed in decrees from the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU and in similar party documents.

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The sharpening of the ideological situation, each against the other, is felt especially in the strengthening of anti-communist, anti-Soviet radio propaganda. Bourgeois radio transmitters have a large network spread throughout the capitalist world which broadcast to the USSR and other socialist countries. This network comprises not only the "Voice of America," the BBC, "Deutsche Welle" (in the FRG), "Liberty," "Free Europe" and the "Voice of Israel," but also a radio transmitter in South Korea broadcasting to the Soviet East and the NHK radio broadcasting corporation which transmits programs in the Russian language. World bourgeois radio--on a 24 hour basis--broadcasts close to 240 hours of programming to the USSR.

There is yet another way to disseminate bourgeois ideas and religious views to part of the population of the USSR. Television programs broadcast from the capitalist countries adjoining the Baltic and Central Asian republics can also be seen.

As is well-known, Western propaganda centers are closely affiliated with imperialist intelligence agencies. A number of workers on program desks which are broadcasting to socialist countries--such as the "Voice of America," "Liberty," "Free Europe" and others--are known to be agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and other similar organizations, and some are fascist hirelings.

The CPSU, Soviet scholars, and communist and workers' parties of foreign countries are studying the theory and practice of bourgeois propaganda and the methods by which they poison men's minds, and they work out recommendations in order to step up the results of the struggle against ideas alien to socialism. The fundamental principles of bourgeois propaganda in articles, books and brochures published by them are clear. These principles are supported by the resultant impact of bourgeois philosophy, sociology and social psychology on the intellect, spiritual aspirations and mood of the listeners and viewers. Bourgeois theoreticians, by means of their interest in expressing their principles and methods of propaganda to the broad masses, attribute their success to the postulate that is characterized by stimulating alienated viewers and sharp feelings. No voices are raised against the stimulation of feelings and proclivities like these in the personality by an entire system which has taken on itself the pointless diversion of educating and influencing the workers in a bourgeois manner. They habitually refer to "the man on the street" (a term from bourgeois sociology), view conformistic thought as good, and tell him simple truths. They want the masses to believe in true spiritual viability and intellectually accept a theoretical truth special to centuries of ignorance. In order to satisfy the masses from this point of view it is not the simple truth given them but rather the knowledge of the centuries such as religious faith, stories and myths which give results. Philosophers and sociologists of capitalism attribute to all class mentalities the strengthening of the irrationality of bourgeois social thought in the imperialist stage of growth and do not recognize the existence of a Marxist-Leninist concept in bourgeois society.

It is necessary to mythologize the societal mentality, to fill it with imaginary ideas and to influence the broad masses of the bourgeois population. Bourgeois propaganda plays the role of creating this type of influence, in other words, poisoning the mass mentality ideologically and subjugating the mentality of the workers to the aspirations of the ruling class.

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In talking about the system of influencing the mass mentality in bourgeois society, it is necessary to note not only a political propaganda apparatus but also the participation of all means affecting man's daily life--art, commercial advertising, the creation of clothing styles for the masses and the marketing of commercial wares. These means, together with political propaganda, set up what is called the "opinion-making industry"; as for the "opinion-making industry," in alignment with ideological functions it also achieves a pure commercial objective--it yields straightaway massive profits for capitalist companies. But the interrelationship of ideological propaganda and bourgeois commerce is not constrained by its penetration here, but at the same time satisfies a financial and spiritual utility as a result of selling newspapers, books, films and phonograph records. In the utilization of socio-psychological mechanisms in order to influence human mentality the political propaganda of capitalism and commercial advertising complement each other.

The discussion is especially about setting up stereotypes of the human thought process by the help of which a person is compelled to accept whatever happens in the world. The theory of stereotypes based on reactionary philosophical and sociological concepts uninterruptedly soiling the human mind in the sociology of mass communications is the basis of the practice of bourgeois propaganda.

The prominent American journalist W. Lippmann considered the importance of stereotypes in propaganda to be primary. He said that models simplified in the human brain under the influence of information received through all sorts of channels formed "simplified images" or stereotypes about the world. According to Lippmann, it is not that stereotypes adequately illuminate the truth, it is that they fundamentally simplify and diminish reality. An important attribute of stereotypes consists of uniting human knowledge with emotional views of the personality. According to this, it gives importance to the emotional shades of stereotypes for bourgeois propaganda and gives them the chance to orchestrate the mentality of that society and to implant misleading images, nationalism, militaristic and anti-communist tendencies in the societal mentality. Stereotypes are established by selecting the necessary information and changing them through the mass information measures of the bourgeoisie. Measures such as casting aspersions on events, placing them into a mold, and distorting the facts when they are related as news in order to stimulate negative emotions are widely used.

Concepts such as the "free world," "the communist menace," "trampling on human rights," "anti-American affairs," "the American way of life" and "national security" are used especially frequently. The diversionary work conducted daily by the bourgeois information organs to implant stereotypes into the mass mentality have a clear result. The Portuguese writer M. Kashtrin in an article in PRAVDA cites the words of an aging compatriot: "Here in our country there is much talk about a an iron curtain. It must be an evil heavy curtain. One should look and see whether this weight is from the iron. There is something else I would like to know: how do the Russians raise and lower it? Do they use their hands, or a capstan, or is there a straightforward mechanism?" In the "free world" of capitalism, see what they do to "purify the brain of the people."

With what means are the many stereotypes, anti-communist and anti-Soviet myths constructed? Let us analyse several of these means.

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Lies and slander are used constantly. In these, it is not only the boulevard press and the rightwing bourgeois publications, but they also use information organs which appear to be far from politics. Let us take an example from an article published in one of the American technical popular magazines. The journal writes this way about the way of life in Soviet Siberia: "...A man on his way to Verkhoyansk was talking in the following manner: when December comes everything these--people, cattle, reindeer and pigs--stay inside their huts. They lie there drinking a Siberian drink called zapoy. The men, their eyes closed from drink, sleep out the coldest months, and their wives wait on them. When springtime comes, all of them stagger to their feet and a powerful voice yells: 'Hey, men, time to meet the morning.'"

That is the way bourgeois propaganda slanders the Soviet way of life. Sometimes Western magazines describe the quality of Soviet life in a friendly manner. In truth, though, they repeat the conceptions about the way of life of peasants in pre-Revolutionary Russia and about vodka which they say "is one of the secret and sorrowful qualities of the Russian soul." Bourgeois propaganda thereby plants the idea in the mind of the masses of the West that socialism is incapable of changing the nature of the national structure, that it was unable to fill it with a new content, and that it was unable to eliminate the causes of national animosities and conflicts.

At the same time it falsifies real socialism, bourgeois propaganda tries to conceal the contradictions in capitalist society and spares no words in embellishing life in the Western countries. In order to do this, methods of statistical comparisons are broadly utilized. By this method they attempt to prove the special nature of their system and its "abundance" in comparison with a system where the workers control the means of production and there is a planned socialist economy. In the below-cited words of V. I. Lenin he reveals the falsity in the basic significance of the exaggeration of average statistical quantities by the bourgeoisie: "The fact that they consolidate workers and owners and extract an "average" to demonstrate the "free way of life" in the shape of "free" pure profits is obvious...But to extract an average number like this is completely false." (Works, V 3, p 152).

Bourgeois ideologists, by means of consolidating a question like this in such an unscientific manner, increase the workers' share of national income in a capitalistic period and reduce the income of the exploiting class equivalently. By utilizing such numerical data they clarify the class orientation of the statistics. While statistical organs of capitalist countries give exact quantitative data on the numerics of production (on metal smelting, machinery production, etc.), in bourgeois society data on the frequency of hunger and spiritual riches, unemployment, the degree of illiteracy and the share taken by the monopoly is changed. Here the fundamental objective consists of concealing the data, the hostility to man of this society, the use and exploitation of social inequities by any means and the minimization of racial and national data at the outset.

As for the discussion of the political system of the West and the valuable aspects of bourgeois democracy, here capitalistic propaganda, while criticizing certain aspects, heaps praise on its structure as a whole. In bourgeois publications distributed in the USSR on the basis of two-party agreements on cultural exchange, such a path is followed. For example, there is an article in the magazine

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"Amerika" called "How and why do I vote?" where it quotes the views of a woman from a middle-class family. At the end of the article she writes: "People interested in politics consider it an interesting occupation connected to policymaking. Whatever the deficiencies in our electoral system that strike other people's eyes, the heart of the American voters fills with hope and joy when a legislative body--be it the Colorado Assembly or the Congress of the USA--there is no difference--is sworn in for a new session." In such materials about the class structure of the legislative organs of the states or of the Congress of the USA certainly nothing is said because to talk about that would be extremely unpleasant in a government of the wealthy whether in America or other countries of capital.

In discussing questions of democracy bourgeois propaganda demonstrates that the formal aspect of the law given in these democracies is connected with the path noted above. Doing thusly gives the possibility of going outside the socio-economical basis of the bourgeois type of such a democracy and of its basic class significance.

Bourgeois propaganda, especially by electing able political and societal workers, attempts to stress the plenty and abundance in the life of a capitalistic society. What is characteristic of bourgeois radio broadcasts destined for the socialist countries is also characteristic of all propaganda publications like "Amerika." One sees this clearly in the 3d number of 1976 of "Angliya" magazine which is intended for Soviet readers. In such articles as "Furnishing the Apartment," "Doctor on an Island," "Play and Learn," "New Breakthrough in Medicine" and "Fashion: New Clothes for Summer" there is no depiction of the antagonisms and real problems between the impoverished and the affluent class or of the British workers or of London's trampling on human rights in Ulster. Thus, even when the publications of capitalist countries do not especially praise bourgeois society in its materials and when they do not criticize flaws in socialism, it gives much space to propagandizing the "abundance" of the Western way of life in every article and educating citizens' views on personal life.

Bourgeois propaganda attempts to instill in the minds of men anti-communist, anti-Soviet stereotypes, false conceptions and distorted views of the socialist way of life by all diversionary means. Bourgeois propaganda, by content, is against science and man and, while it does not refrain from falsehood and ignorance, still holds many people in thrall under capitalistic ruling conditions. Certainly one should not think that bourgeois ideology and bourgeois propaganda dominate in a capitalistic society because in this society the working class and the Marxist-Leninist parties defending the interests of the broad working masses have press organs which conduct Marxist-Leninist propaganda. The broadening of the economic, cultural, touristic and other connections between the two social systems familiarizes the population of capitalist countries with people of the socialist world and the humanistic belief in proletarian internationalism.

At the same time bourgeois propaganda does not forget to poison the atmosphere between the capitalist and socialist countries in the growth of their relationship with its anti-communist ideology. The propaganda activity of the class enemies of socialism is never neglected. As affirmed in the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the further strengthening of ideological and political-education activity," "it is our duty to protect the indestructible collegiality of our paths,

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the powerful unity of ideas and the deep belief of every Soviet man and our political awareness for which we had our Patriotic socialist revolution against the diversionary political and ideological work of the class enemy and its badly-intended slander against socialism."

Knowledge of the primary methods, principles and operations of bourgeois propaganda will strengthen the party organization in its class positions of socialism in ideational-educational work and, on the basis of teaching the exceptional example of the socialist way of life, will give the possibility of reaching new heights.

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NATIONAL

NATIONALISM, RELIGIOSITY IN DAGESTAN

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[Article by M.G. Mustafayeva (Makhachkala): "International Contacts, Internationalist and Atheistic Training"]

[Text] The study of problems of internationalist and atheistic training under conditions of international [mezhnatsional'nyy]* and intercreedal contacts is a complex and multilevel problem.

In this article we first would like to examine the social-psychological nature of international contacts as an inseparable aspect of the process of internationalization of social life under the conditions of mature socialism; second, to attempt to reveal the nature of the influence of international contacts on processes of secularization and, finally, to dwell on the practical tasks that these two aspects raise before the process of internationalist and atheistic training.

In recent years, the very problem of contacts and reciprocal influence of people has become the object of growing scientific interest. Social-psychological problems of international contacts remain weakest and least studied. The history of mankind attests to the fact that each people at different stages of their history has experienced to a greater or lesser degree in the course of contacts the definite influence of other peoples. They have emulated their economic experience, borrowed individual forms and elements of economic and other traditions and enriched and improved their culture and language. The social contacts of peoples exert an influence on all aspects of national life. As a result of these contacts, there arises a whole series of phenomena that are extra-national in their nature, which undoubtedly contributes to the development of peoples and to their rapprochement.

The character of intercourse of peoples wholly and entirely depends on means of production and on type of social relations, whereas contacts of nationalities occur spontaneously; international intercourse under socialism, which is without doubt voluntary, possesses a conscious and scientifically guided character. Within the

* [Translator's note: From hereon, international, as indicated by the text, will refer almost entirely, if not exclusively, to the term "mezhnatsional'nyy." In Soviet usage, the term "mezhnatsional'nyy" relates to relations of the nations and nationalities within the confines of the USSR rather than to those outside it.]

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framework of the USSR, more than 100 nations and nationalities participate in close contacts. The well-known thesis of K. Marx to the effect that "each nation can and must learn from others"¹ under socialism becomes the norm and law of their intercourse.

The general Soviet, internationalist, atheistic traits to be found in the psychology, culture and way of life of the Soviet peoples are the product of their more than sixty years of international contacts of the socialist type, a lawful result of the process of internationalization.

The intercourse of nationalities constitutes a social-psychological phenomenon in whose structure a multiplicity of aspects is to be found. In our view, the crux of international intercourse is determined by the following four factors: communication, interaction, cognition and interrelations.²

We shall attempt to provide a brief exposition of them.

The function of communication in international life plays a big role in the transmission of different kinds of information, such as informative, regulative. This communication is achieved through transmission of information by means of different channels of communication.

International ties relating to exchange of values, achievements and trade have always been accompanied throughout history by the development of nationalities.

We understand interaction of nationalities to be a process that occurs in the course of joint activity of people of different nationalities in fulfillment of the common task of building a communist society in our country. The society of developed socialism promotes a high level of mobility among the population. This in turn ensures a high degree of interaction of nationalities and their reciprocal influence.

Cognition is a process in which there takes place the perception of foreign national values as the result of psychological analysis and selection. It occurs on the basis of definite interpretation and processing of adopted social experience. The specifics of its development are such that in the process of international contacts, people, on the one hand, realize quite totally their national affiliation and, on the other, learn to apprehend and develop certain value judgments in regard to foreign national values, culture, language, social traditions and customs.

Interrelations refer to all kinds of ties and relations of peoples of different nationalities which they engage in in the process of labor and other contacts in their free time by virtue of being neighbors, relatives and the like. In this way people establish value attitudes toward foreign national phenomena. It is namely through direct interrelations of people of different nationalities that the full breadth of international contacts is formed.

Thus, international contacts are not only necessary; they constitute a most significant aspect of people's life activity and are displayed in all spheres of life of a nation or nationality.

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The different forms of community without doubt leave a definite imprint on the process of internationalization of the consciousness of the individual. Direct contact in international intercourse is principal and guiding in our opinion.

Let us turn to examples of direct contact of Soviet people of different nationalities. In this connection, it would hardly be possible to find another such spot in our Motherland as Dagestan where such a large number of peoples and languages are in close and active international contact. The republic is traditionally called a "land of mountains and a mountain of languages." The exalted singer of Dagestan Rasul Gamzatov expressed this feature of the republic in the tale "My Dagestan" as follows: In Dagestan, "there may be found people riding on one bullock cart speaking five languages, and should five bullock carts stop at an intersection, you would hear thirty languages."

Today it would be difficult to imagine in Dagestan a populated area where several nationalities are not simultaneously in direct contact. Thus, at the well-known grape Sovkhoz imeni Sh. Aliyev in Derbentskiy Rayon, representatives of 18 nationalities--Russians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Lezghinians, Darginians, Tabasarians, Avars, Laks, Kumyks and others--work shoulder to shoulder.³ Druzhba Village in Kayakentskiy Rayon is an example of friendship and fraternity of peoples. Here Lezghinians, Tabasarians, Aguls, Kumyks and Darginians live and work as an international family.

It is interesting to note that a tremendous number of specialists of all nationalities in the republic have received their training in VUZ's and tekhnikums of the country (in Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Groznyy, Tbilisi, Taganrog and many other cities).

It is well known that the nationalities of Dagestan do not possess a common linguistic character. They are aided by Russian, the second native language of the peoples of the USSR, which has been rightfully acknowledged everywhere as the language of international intercourse. The active and direct contact of several nationalities in social and everyday life contributes to the development not only of bilingualism but also to trilingualism.

Migratory processes are intensified under the conditions of developed socialism. A form of migration in Dagestan is planned resettlement from high-mountainous inhabited areas that are difficult as to access to lowlands and foothills. During the years of the Soviet power there have been resettled on lowlands more than 130,000 persons. In this time more than 60 well-appointed villages were built for them. Due to resettlement, there is an expansion of direct contacts among people of different nationalities; exchange of work experience and reciprocal influence are intensified. New multinational rayons have appeared. The tendency for increase of migratory processes constitutes a characteristic feature of the demographic problems of all Soviet society.⁴ These processes stem from the large scope of industrial construction; they are also the social consequence of scientific-technical progress and urbanization.

The fast growth of international ties and relations, creating objective conditions for the further rapprochement of people of different nationalities on an international basis, is accompanied in some instances by a number of negative processes caused by the hypertrophic development of national self-consciousness. In coming

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into contact with people of a different social-ethnic and religious group and with the peculiarities of their way of thinking and behaving, the mountaineer displays his national standards, his national and religious characteristics, as the individual senses his social and ethnic or religious traits, his affiliation with a given ethnic group and takes part in international ties and contacts.

It should be especially emphasized that among believers who have been resettled from remote mountainous districts in the lowlands, growth of national self-consciousness is significantly distorted by religious prejudices. In the consciousness of such believers, Islam, being associated with national self-consciousness, emerges as the expression of national community, as a common trait of people of a given nationality. This in certain cases leads to a certain revival of cult and ceremonial activity on the part of believers. Together with national traditions and customs, a portion of believers tries to display religious traditions, especially those containing holiday and celebration moments and possessing a socially demonstrative character. It is no accident that the number of those who observe Moslem holidays with fulfillment of national customs and traditions in cities, rayons and settlements with a population that differs in its national and religious makeup is bigger than in populated areas with a homogeneous ethnic makeup.

In the course of concrete sociological investigations, many believers have elicited opinions in conversations, the meaning of which boils down to the fact that people must differ in some way from each other, even in religion. The identification of the religious with the national and on this basis a certain revival of religious customs of Islamic practice are not determined by the growth of religious consciousness but are the result of misunderstanding and incorrect evaluation of national values and the inability to differentiate and separate the truly national from the religious. The participation of people in religious holidays most frequently under the guise of preservation of national features emerges here as a consequence rather than a cause.

Thus, in rapidly growing cities and on newly organized resettlement farms with a varied national and religious makeup of the population, two opposing tendencies are to be observed.

On the one hand, joint labor activity, collective mutual relations and mutual assistance, common political and social-economic goals and cultural and social conditions intensify mutual contacts of people and unite them through common character in all spheres of life. On this basis, there occurs an inexorable fall of national barriers and the further forming of common, international traits of Soviet people and of non-religious customs and ceremonials.

On the other hand, there may occur among a part of the believing and indifferent population a tendency of temporary revival of certain religious customs and holidays under the banner of national difference, which to a certain degree alienates and isolates people of different nationalities and religious faiths, especially in the sphere of family-and-marriage and moral-and-social relations.

Investigators of the demographic problems of Dagestan's urban population note that a significant percentage of the population exists in constant active and direct international contact. The national composition of such of the republic's cities as Makhachkala, Derbent, Buynaksk, Khasavyurt, Izberbash, Kizlyar, Kizilyurt

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and Kaspiysk includes Russian Avars, Darginians, Kumyks, Lesghinians, Laks, Tabasarians, Nogaytsy, Rutul'tsy, Aguls, Tsakhurs, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, mountaineer Jews, Ukrainians, Armenians and others comprise a significant share. Accordingly, production, office, teaching and other kinds of collectives are made up of representatives of these nationalities. Among the collectives, a process of internationalization of way of life, opinions, tastes and beliefs is taking place. Internationalism in a multinational labor collective is a sign of a healthy moral and psychological climate, a decisive factor in the successful operation of a collective. A marked and natural growth of the number of international marriages, for example, is observed among these collectives.

A characterization of this process from positions of contacts of nationalities in the sphere of family and marriage relations would require, in our opinion, a more detailed analysis of available factual material on the republic. Dagestanian historians justly underscore that although the indigenous nationalities of the republic have remained in one or another degree in direct economic and ethnocultural contact, marriages between representatives of different nationalities, especially when different faiths are involved, have been a rare exception. A serious hindrance to the conclusion of international marriages has existed from way back because of the semi-natural character of the economy, because of language barriers, clan endogamy and territorial separateness and because of the ideology of ethnic exclusiveness, specific traditions, customs and rites. Marriages that were preferable were considered to be those concluded not only within the village but also within the clan group--the tukhum. International marriages occurred more frequently only in the feudal milieu. Dagestanian khans, beys, shamkhals, utsmis and others intermarried not only with each other but also with the feudal rulers of the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus primarily for political reasons.

An ideological barrier in the conclusion of interethnic marriages in prerevolutionary Dagestan was the religion--Islam. Marriages particularly between Russians and representatives of the nationalities of Dagestan constituted an exception. According to the Shariat, a Moslem man had the right to marry a person of another faith, but a Moslem woman could marry a person of another faith only on the condition that he adopt Islam. Nonobservance of this condition was considered to be on the level of apostasy, an insult to social mores and a violation of the age-old Hadith. While marriage by a Dagestanian man to a woman of another faith was extremely rare, it did take place, but the marriage of a Dagestanian woman to a man of another faith meant fleeing beyond the boundaries of the region, persecution, blood vengeance. A mountain woman violating the norms of national and religious homogeneity would have been forced to leave the familial hearth, while her relatives would have been subjected to every possible humiliation and social censure on the part of fellow-villagers.

The victory of socialism, social and cultural progress and the triumph of the ideas and principles of internationalism have produced in regard to life new manifestations in the national and religious sense--international and intercreedal marriages.

A study of registration cards for all rural and urban settlements in Dagestan at the republic archives of the Civil Registry Office for 1973 that was conducted by the Ethnography Section of the Dagestan Affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences made it possible to establish a number of tendencies in the growth and development

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of international marriages. As shown by sociological-research data, marriage in the great majority of cases occur within a particular nationality or ethnic group (Avar men with Avar women, Darginian men with Darginian women and so on). They comprised 86.3 percent of the total number of concluded marriages.

The biggest percentages of marriages of the same nationality were recorded for Darginians (93.5), Avars (91.7), Lezghinians (91.6), Tsakhurs (91.4); the percentage was somewhat smaller for Laks (85.2), Kumyks (84.2), Tabasarians (84), Azerbaijanis (74.7).

At the same time the relative share of international marriages is growing for Dagestan as a whole. Whereas in 1939, they comprised 5.7 percent, in 1963--10.5 and in 1967--12.6 percent, by 1973 their percentage had increased to 13.7 percent of the total number of marriages concluded in the republic.

The greatest percentage of international marriages takes place among the urban population, where they comprised 24.8 percent in 1967 and 25.5 percent in 1975. In large urban settlements, the relative share of international marriages was still higher: in Kizilyurt--36.7 percent, in Makhachkala--28.8 percent, in Buynaksk--24.2 percent, in Kaspiysk--24.1 percent and in Izberbash--23.2 percent. There were fewer international marriages in Ogni (20.6 percent), Khasavyurt (19.1 percent), Derbent (15.1 percent). The high percentage of international marriages in cities is to be explained first and foremost by the international makeup of their population, city production and teaching collectives and a higher level of education and culture among the youth. The number of international marriages is increasing in these cities due to the students in higher and secondary educational institutions and students at vocational-technical schools.

In rural regions of the republic, the percentage of international marriages as a whole is not high (4.8 toward the end of the '60s and 7.4 in 1973). An exception is to be found in rural districts located near cities and worker settlements, particularly in the lowland. Thus, in Babayurtovskiy Rayon in 1973, the percentage of international marriages was 21.7, in Tarumovskiy--19.3, in Nogayskiy--17.3, in Derbentskiy--17, in Kizlyarskiy--16.8, in Kizilyurtovskiy--12.6 and in Kaytagskiy--12.4.

International marriages in districts with a homogeneous composition are either significantly smaller or nonexistent. Thus, for example, in 1973 in Akushinskiy Rayon only 3 out of 296 marriages were international; in Botlikhskiy Rayon only one out of 153 marriages were international; in Sovetskiy Rayon (rural) only one out of 133 marriages was international and in Dakhadayevskiy only 2 out of 213 marriages were international.

Sociological researches show that international marriages occur most frequently between representatives of the indigenous nationalities of Dagestan. The psychology of national isolation, national distrust was characteristic in prerevolutionary times, but it is now being actively overcome. Former endogamy and homogeneous marriages are being replaced by international and intercreedal marriages.

In rural localities, the highest percentages of mixed marriages are concluded between representatives of Dagestani peoples (60 percent), while marriages concluded between Dagestanians and non-Dagestanians constitute isolated cases. These data attest to the fact that not only are rural districts of the republic more homogeneous

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in the ethnic sense than cities or worker settlements but also that the character of traditions of ethnic endogamy and homogeneity in the countryside is more stable. The process of lapsing of these traditions evidently requires more time inasmuch as it impinges on the deep psychological strata of human consciousness.

Attention is attracted to the large number of ethnic components forming international marriages. In 1973 male Kumyks and Lezghinians, for example, intermarried with 18 other nationalities of Dagestan, male Avars--with 16, male Darginians and Laks--with 12. Among Avars, as in the '60s, there was a predominance of marriages with female Kumyks (61 out of 203 international marriages), with Russians (55 of 203 international marriages) and with female Lachkes [Lachki] (19 of 203). Among Darginians, first place is occupied by marriages with female Kumyks (53 of 140 international marriages), second place--with female Russians (30 of 140), then with female Avars (13 of 140) and with female Lachkes and Lezghinians (11 and 6 marriages, respectively, of 140). Among Lezghinians international marriages predominate with Russians--44 of 140 international marriages and with female Azerbaijanis and Tabasarians--19 and 15 marriages, respectively, of 140. Among Kumyks, of 242 international marriages, 83 were with Russian females, 44--with Avar females, 37--with Darginian female, 29--with Chechen females. Among Laks, of 101 international marriages 31 were with Russian women, 17 with Avar women and 15 with Darginian women.

A special feature of marriages in Dagestan is in addition growth of the relative share of international marriages between men of the indigenous nationalities of Dagestan and Russian women. It is interesting to note that of 424 international marriages concluded in 1973 in the republic, 311, or 73.3 percent, consisted of Russian-Dagestani marriages.

A perfectly new development is to be found in marriages concluded between mountain women and representatives of non-Dagestani, especially European, peoples. In 1973, there were 152 such marriages, or 20.4 percent of the total number of international marriages.

Comparative data disclose that the old traditions are more persistent among women. But the existence of marriages of mountain women with non-Dagestanians makes it possible to speak of the onset of the process of overcoming these old traditions and of the disappearance of the sense of national bias and exclusiveness. Profound changes are taking place in the psychology and outlook not only of young women but also of elderly ones, who, in permitting and approving such marriages of the youth, as it were, reinforce and "bless" the new ideology of internationalism. Whereas in 1936, judging by archival data, only one mountain woman (a Darginian) married a Russian, today such marriages constitute 19.3 percent (82 of 424 marriages).

In describing international marriages in Dagestan as a primary social microenvironment for the mixing of people of different nationalities and faiths, it is necessary, in our view, to especially dwell on an analysis of the language of use between spouses. Special ethnographic observations and sociological studies show that for many ethnic mixed families (especially in rural localities) bilingualism prevails. The language of both spouses, as well as the Russian language, which serves as the language of international intercourse both in urban and in rural localities, is spoken in the family. But this general tendency of growth of bilingualism does not exclude the presence of variants. Thus, if one of the spouses comes from central regions of the USSR (Russian, Ukrainian) and the family lives in

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in a city or in a multinational worker settlement, the Russian language usually becomes the language of the family. In rural localities, however, where the population for the most part speaks in the language of one of the indigenous nationalities (Avar, Darginian, Lezghinian, Kumyk and so on) and one of the spouses belongs to the given nationality, the language used by the spouses usually becomes the language of the surrounding social and regional microenvironment. Here a gradual process is proceeding of assimilation of the migrant. In Dagestan, two-language families predominate when both languages are used to the same degree languages of everyday intercourse. There are particularly many such families in rural localities, more frequently in families of employees, teachers, physicians and so forth, and particularly in Dagestanian-Russian marriages. If the wife comes from elsewhere (Russian, Ossetian), the children usually speak with the father in his native language and with the mother in Russian, but the language of the surrounding milieu nevertheless predominates. Should, however, such a family move to another locality, where the population uses another language, or to a city, the family usually begins to speak primarily in Russian, that is, in a language with whose aid the family deals with the surrounding population.

In this way, international contacts contribute to the growth of international and intercreedal marriages. In their turn, these marriages create most favorable conditions for internationalization and atheization of the way of life of different nationalities and faiths. However, residence in a populated area or work and social activity in one collective, or under the same conditions in a settlement of the rural type, do not in every case result in international and intercreedal marriages. In exactly the same way, not every international or intercreedal family is internationalist or atheistic.

As already noted above, under present-day conditions, contacts of nationalities take place not only directly but also indirectly. Such a form of contact is principally connected with the mass information media: press, radio, television, motion pictures, telegraph, telephone. All expanding contacts of regions, republics, cities, production and educational collectives, as well as exchange of material and spiritual values contribute to indirect international contacts.

Indirect contacts of nationalities in the age of scientific-technical progress are being increasingly activated. For the internationalist and atheistic training of workers, it assumes an increasingly bigger importance. The relative share of mass information media is rather large. Furthermore, intercourse with the help of mass information displays at the present time a sharply expressed tendency for growth of the general volume of spiritual contacts of people of different nationalities. According to the data of a sociological survey conducted in Taganrog, the residents of this city basically obtain information through the following sources: newspapers, radio and television--80.3 percent of those surveyed and the rest through conversations with coworkers, relatives and neighbors.⁸

Simultaneous coverage of a large multinational and multicreedal mass of people by the information media gives birth to previously unthinkable forms of exchange of experience and results of work among people, expands the international outlook of a person and of his range of information on these or those foreign national customs and traditions and on the special features of the life style of other peoples of the USSR and the peoples of fraternal socialist countries and promotes the forming of a unified internationalist and atheistic Soviet public opinion on these events of social life.

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There should be pointed out the dialectical interconnection of indirect and direct contacts of peoples. One form of contact supplements the other. The indirect form of contact of peoples gradually created a need for direct contacts. The need for contacts and for the expansion of the geography of ties and friendly bonds with other peoples is constantly growing. While the indirect form of contacts of peoples as it were expands the limits of direct contacts, indirect contacts increasingly and more effectively contribute to mutual rapprochement, exchange of elements of life style, social and various other traditions and customs. The dialectics of the interrelation of these two forms of contact by nationalities is a dual, developing, contradictory and scientifically controlled process.

Contacts of nationalities produce in the individual the characteristic of imitation and borrowing of the foreign national, which is an objective requirement of any national community. Imitation and intercourse constitute interdependent terms. The imitation of something foreign national is inconceivable without international contacts. Peoples mixing with each other do not imitate everything but adopt what is closest and related. Consequently, imitation in international contacts is a social-psychological phenomenon characterized by the reproduction and imitation of a model, with account being taken of special national features, certain social norms of morality and social-historical conditions.

In international intercourse, certain negative social-psychological phenomena and negative national stereotypes play a retarding, disintegrating role: prejudices, religious-nationalistic antipathies, social orientations and preconceived religious-nationalistic public opinion. The functioning of national traditions and customs may to some degree limit and hinder the process of intercourse of nationalities inasmuch as traditions and customs are manifestations of a normative form of intercourse and a social-normative program of international intercourse.

It should be pointed out that the process of fighting religious-nationalistic survivals and the process of affirmation of internationalism and atheism like moral traits of the individual operates most contradictorily. It is one thing when we purposefully and systematically work with children from their young years in terms of internationalist and atheistic training before various religious-nationalistic ideas and opinions become fixed in their consciousness and habits. It is quite another when we let this time slip by and thus provide an opportunity for negative religious-nationalistic orientations to be formed in the early years; after these have been established in a person, after views and opinions have acquired a fixed character in the spiritual makeup of the individual, we then must begin a reeducation of the person in the spirit of internationalism and atheism. From this we can conclude that internationalist and atheistic training of Soviet people must be started at an early age.

In the overcoming of religious-nationalistic survivals in the process of international intercourse, the role of public opinion is great. The formation of new, socialist qualities in workers of all USSR nationalities and also the extirpation of everything that we call religious-nationalistic survivals of the past in the consciousness and behavior of people demand the further boosting of the educative role of public opinion. Noting this, the 25th CPSU Congress pointed out that public opinion should be actively directed in the struggle against individual instances

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of display of a local, nihilistic, religious, nationalistic approach to national values, customs, language and culture.⁹

At the present stage of the building of communism, public opinion is becoming an increasingly effective force in internationalist and atheistic training.

Under socialism, the peoples of the USSR have to such a degree drawn closer and become linked spiritually, that common traits of spiritual makeup have been formed in them. Internationalism and atheism in their spiritual makeup have assumed a lasting and stable position and have been transformed into an ideological, political and moral value. But the process of internationalization and atheization of the spiritual life of the peoples of the USSR does not at all mean, as bourgeois ideologists are attempting to prove, the negation and elimination of the national.

It would be deeply fallacious to understand the process of internationalization and atheization of social life as one of leveling or standardization. "The internationalization of the Soviet way of life is a harmonious embodiment in a single whole of everything that is valuable that nations and nationalities possess, including both preserved progressive traditions of the past and new traits of living, of social psychology, culture and the rest, arising under the conditions of the building of socialism."¹⁰ The joining of the national with Soviet, international and atheistic and the transformation of the national into Soviet do not at all signify the dissolution of the national. Such a joining confers on the very nature of the national new, international traits and nuances, which is an objective and inevitable process. The national in the process of close and active international intercourse becomes the property of not just one people but of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR. Within the framework of the new social-political, internationalist and atheistic community of people, Soviet nations and nationalities not only do not lose what is theirs and national but, on the contrary, obtain complete freedom for all-round development.

Thus, international intercourse is a socially oriented process. The latter occurs because of social need and necessity. The socially oriented character of international intercourse expresses or achieves national relations as a specific form of social relations.

The historical experience of building of socialism both in our country and in the fraternal socialist countries has irrefutably proved to the entire world that at the present time, under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, only the socialist social-political system is in a position of fully utilizing all the advantages of the socialist order for the strengthening and enrichment of the economic, political and spiritual ties among people of different nationalities.

FOOTNOTES

1. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 23, p 10.
2. See on this: B.D. Parygin, "Osnovy sotsial'no-psikhologicheskoy teorii" ["Fundamentals of Social-Psychological Theory]. Moscow, 1971, pp 219-280; V.N. Panferov, "The Psychology of Intercourse," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 7, 1971, p 126.

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3. See N.A. Aliyev, "The Movement for a Communist Attitude Toward Labor and Strengthening of Friendship of Peoples," "Internatsional'noye vospitaniye trudyashchikhsya" [International Training of Workers]. Makhachkala, 1974, pp 163-167.
4. See M. Sukhikov and G. Demakov, "Vliyaniye podvizhnosti naseleniya na sblizheniye natsiy" [Influence of Population Mobility on the Rapprochement of Nations]. Alma-Ata, 1974; V.G. Alekseyeva, "Urbanization: Way of life and Problems of Education of Youth," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 6, 1975.
5. See V.F. Aliyeva, "Gorodskoye naseleniya Dagestana" [The Urban Population of Dagestan]. Makhachkala, 1975, pp 128-129.
6. See "Istoriya Dagestana" [History of Dagestan], Vol I. Moscow, 1967.
7. See S.Sh. Gadzhiyeva and Z.A. Yankova, "Dagestanskaya sem'ya segodnya" [The Dagestani Family Today]. Makhachkala, 1978, Table 1; S.Sh. Gadzhiyeva, "Sem'ya i semeynyy byt narodov Dagestana" [Family and Family Life of the Peoples of Dagestan]. Makhachkala, 1967, pp 80-81. "Sovremennaya kul'tura i byt narodov Dagestana" [Contemporary Culture and Life of the Peoples of Dagestan]. Moscow, 1971, pp 182-183.
8. See P.K. Kurochkin, "Mass Information Media--an Important Ideological Weapon of the Communist Party," FILOSOFSKIYE NAUKI, No 1, 1972, p 15.
9. See "Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress]. Moscow, 1976, PP 72-73, 75.
10. "The Soviet People--a New Historical Community of People," KOMMUNIST, No 12, 1972, p 13.

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